Attending to opportunity: an attention-based model of how boards of directors impact strategic entrepreneurship in established enterprise by Tuggle, Christopher Scott
   
   
 
ATTENDING TO OPPORTUNITY: AN ATTENTION-BASED MODEL OF 
HOW BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IMPACT STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ESTABLISHED ENTERPRISES 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
by 
 CHRISTOPHER SCOTT TUGGLE 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
  
December 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Management 
 
   
   
ATTENDING TO OPPORTUNITY: AN ATTENTION-BASED MODEL OF 
HOW BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IMPACT STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ESTABLISHED ENTERPRISES 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
 
by  
 
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT TUGGLE 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________________ 
     Don Hellriegel                  Asghar Zardkoohi 
 (Chair of Committee)             (Member) 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________________ 
 Albert A. Cannella, Jr      Arvind Mahajan 
       (Member)             (Member) 
 
 
_______________________________   
     Angelo DeNisi          
(Head of Department)       
 
December 2004 
 
Major Subject: Management 
 
 
 
     
  
iii
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Attending to Opportunity: An Attention-Based Model of How Boards of Directors 
Impact Strategic Entrepreneurship in Established Enterprises. 
(December 2004) 
Christopher Scott Tuggle, B.S., Missouri Southern State University; 
M.B.A., Southwest Missouri State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Don Hellriegel 
 
Using the attention-based view, this study is concerned with two levels of board 
of directors’ interaction relating to strategic entrepreneurship: (1) how individual board 
members may affect the attention of the entire board, and (2) how the board may affect 
the attention and resource allocation of the firm.  Unique to prior literature, this study 
considers contextual factors at each level of interaction and views the board room 
communications through unprecedented access. Multiple regression and negative 
binomial regression analyses are used to test the theoretical hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation and Research Questions 
 Why Should We Study Entrepreneurship in Existing Organizations? Any firm’s 
long-term competitive challenge includes addressing successive shifts in both the 
dominant technology within its industry and market requirements or preferences for the 
firm’s product. To sustain and prosper from such shifts, a firm needs to seek new 
competency opportunities while simultaneously leveraging existing competencies. Thus, 
its decision-makers must continually reinvent the firm entrepreneurially. Considering the 
“opportunity environment” of the firm, this study investigates the roles that boards of 
directors, both as individuals and as a whole, play in the process of strategic 
entrepreneurship.     
 Prior entrepreneurship researchers have frequently used the terms 
entrepreneurship and new business ventures synonymously.  This lack of distinction 
between the two terms implicitly suggests that entrepreneurship only occurs in new 
ventures. Can people in existing organizations not act entrepreneurially? A number of 
studies have found no support for such distinctions between entrepreneurs and managers 
or other reference samples (Low & Macmillan, 1988; Stuart & Abetti, 1990).  
 Hoskisson and Busenitz (2002) note that 80 percent of the research and 
development (inherently entrepreneurially focused) conducted in developed nations 
takes place in large firms. However, they also state that large firms account for less than 
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half of recorded patents. Therefore, while large firms allocate more resources toward 
entrepreneurial endeavors, they may be inefficient in identifying and/or exploiting 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Ahuja and Lampert (2001) suggest that larger established 
firms are producing or certainly contributing to the production of radical or 
“breakthrough” innovation much more than is recognized. They contend that large firms 
can, and at least some do, develop routines to foster the production of major innovations 
that represent significant technological breakthroughs.  
 The Construct of Strategic Entrepreneurship. Hitt, Ireland, Camp and Sexton 
(2002) suggest that the concept of strategic entrepreneurship details the strategic 
discipline through which exploration is used to identify entrepreneurial opportunities and 
exploit them to create firm wealth. Thus, strategic entrepreneurship facilitates firms’ 
efforts to identify the best opportunities (matched to their resources and with the highest 
potential returns) and to exploit these opportunities with the discipline of a strategic 
business plan. The goal of strategic entrepreneurship is to continuously create 
competitive advantages that lead to maximum wealth creation. Strategic 
entrepreneurship is a critically important business concept for the twenty-first century 
(Hitt et al., 2002). 
 Opportunity recognition is prompted from existing stocks of information that 
influence an individual’s framework for interpreting new information. To recognize an 
opportunity, an individual has to have prior information that is complementary with the 
new information, which triggers an entrepreneurial conjecture (Kaish & Gilad, 1991). 
Opportunity recognition is at the heart of all entrepreneurial endeavors, as an opportunity 
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can only be realized after it has been recognized. So if recognizing entrepreneurial 
opportunities is so important, a couple of questions intuitively arise: How can a firm 
actively seek to identify or discover entrepreneurial opportunities? What is important in 
identifying opportunities? Some scholars have suggested that prior knowledge and/or 
experience plays a role (e.g. Simon, 1947, Shane, 2000). Others attribute entrepreneurial 
acumen to specific innate traits of individuals. Many scholars have studied the 
relationship between existing organizations and entrepreneurial activity, specifically, 
how organizational (1) structure (Hornsby, Kuratko, & Zahra, 2002; Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996a; Naman & Slevin, 1993; Russell & Russell, 1992), (2) rewards (Brazeal, 1993; 
Hornsby et al., 2002; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997), (3) managerial style 
(strategic or financial system) (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Chell & Allman, 
2003; Messeghem, 2003), etc… relate to entrepreneurial outcomes within the firms.  
However, prior studies have failed to consider the context in which entrepreneurial 
strategies and actions are embedded. 
 Why Should We Study Board Impact on Strategic Entrepreneurship? The 
allocation of firm resources toward a future potential competency carries considerable 
risk for top management. They may be concerned that they will be evaluated sooner than 
the development of the new competency can be realized. Agency theory describes the 
potential for conflicts of interest that arise from the separation of ownership and control 
in organizations (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). It suggests that 
managers may be more likely to choose strategies that leverage existing competencies 
rather than strategies that pursue future firm competencies. With such top management 
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risk aversion in mind, this study turns to firms’ boards of directors as the decision 
makers who may directly influence the attention allocation of top managers and 
indirectly impact strategy resource allocation. 
 The 1990’s presented corporate strategists with a unique problem, too much 
information.  To be valuable, information must be timely, relevant, and accurate. The 
problem of information overload has prevented these strategists from being able to 
process available information in a timely manner without the aid of an “information 
gathering and filtration system”. This dissertation suggests that the board of directors is 
at a distinctive boundary of the firm where management may utilize the board as a key 
opportunity information gathering and filtration system. 
 Boards are expected to both protect shareholder value and help create it (Charan, 
1998).  The resource dependence theory views a firm as an open system, dependent on 
external organizations and environmental contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Research using resource dependence theory has demonstrated that inter-organizational 
relationships created through board memberships have a mutually beneficial effect by 
according firms increased coordination, a reduction in transaction costs, and better 
access to both information and resources (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Directors share their 
expertise and wisdom as a matter of course.  Directors’ real potential lies in their 
abilities to help management prevent problems, seize opportunities, and make the firm 
perform better than it otherwise would. As the management and the board learn together, 
a collective wisdom emerges and managerial judgment may improve. The board’s most 
general purpose is to continually refocus management’s attention on the external 
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environment. Directors may enrich manager’s views of the economic, competitive, 
technological, political, cultural, and other contexts of the firm. Outside directors, in 
particular, may offer unique perspectives regarding an organization’s external realities.  
Thus, the right set of directors may be a strategic asset to a corporation.  
 The relationship between the board and top management is a critical factor in 
determining the attention of the board and how the board attempts to shape the attention 
of top management, including the allocation of firm resources. When the board believes 
they have the right CEO running the organization, the intersecting territory where the 
corporation’s management and the outside directors meet offers many value creating 
opportunities. The board is, after all, the best opportunity a CEO has to surface blind 
spots and faulty reasoning. It is also a potential source of creative thinking about new 
opportunities for growth (Charan, 1998). Although, it is not their mandate to create 
strategy, boards can help management assess the need, direction, and speed of change. 
Though boards are sometimes depicted as adversarial toward management or as a mere 
guardian of management’s self-serving opportunism, many CEO’s recognize the board 
as a source of wisdom that asks tough, incisive questions, and offers valuable insights. 
The ideal situation is an involved board that doesn’t micro-manage. 
 Directors, as representatives of shareholders, may attempt to manage the 
company’s risk portfolio. If management is acting too conservatively, directors can 
prompt the management to pursue more or different opportunities.  They may help top 
management strike a balance between conflicting dispositions: long-term versus short-
term performance, internal versus external demands, and the CEO’s personal tendencies. 
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Directors’ years of business experience make them particularly good at sifting through 
the hard and soft data to discern whether nonperformance in the short-term is due to 
management’s inability to execute or is driven by external change.  Quality directors, set 
in the proper board-management context, should spend most of their time managing risk 
and looking for growth opportunities (Charan, 1998). 
 The real value of the board lies in its collective wisdom and perspective. The 
composition of a board should provide a match with contextual factors in order to most 
effectively facilitate execution of the board’s mandate (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989).  Directors’ diversity of experiences may add distinctive value when 
they see things through different lenses than that of management. The best learning 
comes from the candid exchange of ideas on issues that are critical to the business. 
Conclusions reflect the thinking of the whole board, not of any one individual. As board 
members challenge and build on one another’s comments, the envelope of thinking and 
the boundaries of perspective may be expanded.  When this occurs, the board is not 
merely a formality, but rather a vibrant participant in the corporation’s value-creation 
process.  
  The concept of strategic entrepreneurship lies at a natural intersection of the 
strategic management and entrepreneurship literatures. However, a significant gap 
persists in each literature regarding questions of who affects firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurship and the process by which they affect it. To gain insight on the who and 
how of strategic entrepreneurship, the following research questions are suggested:  
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1. Do boards of directors impel, impede, or exert influence on organizational 
strategic entrepreneurship? 
  
2. If they (as an entire board) do exert influence, how does the process function 
and in what context(s) does it occur? 
  
3. Can individual directors influence the attention of the collective board toward 
strategic entrepreneurship? If so, who are such directors? And, why are they 
able to shift the collective board’s attention? 
 
4. As boards of directors shift their collective attention toward strategic 
entrepreneurship, is there a change of firm resources toward it as well? 
Theoretical Conceptualization 
 To gain greater understanding of the board’s impact on strategic entrepreneurship 
in existing organizations, this dissertation builds on Ocasio’s (1997) conceptualization of 
the attention-based view, hereafter referred to as “model”. Ocasio (1997) applies the 
attention-based model to the entire organization. Focus here is on how the attention-
based model addresses the board of directors’ attention allocation and, subsequently, 
how the board then attempts to direct the attention of the organization. 
 One of the critical issues in strategy, to which the attention-based model can be 
applied, is whether and how firms adapt to changing environments. Unlike either models 
based on rationality or models based on environmental determinism, an attention-based 
model of the firm provides a unified process-based explanation for the conflicting 
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findings of both inertia and successful adaptation in organizations. The attention-based 
model implies that whether and how firms adapt to a changing environment is not a 
foregone conclusion. Rather, it results from specific contingencies arising from the 
firm’s procedural and communication channels and attention structures (Ocasio, 1997). 
This is an improvement over the current state of theorizing where different models are 
applied to explain different outcomes, but no unified conceptual framework incorporates 
disparate outcomes.   
 At the individual level, attention includes the noticing and focusing of time and 
effort on both the environmental stimuli requiring action and the available repertoire of 
responses which define that action (Ocasio, 1997).  The attention-based model 
conceptualizes firms as systems of structurally distributed attention in which the 
cognition and action of individuals are not predictable from the knowledge of individual 
characteristics. Rather, they derive from the specific organizational context and 
situations in which individual decision-makers find themselves. Attention encompasses 
the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by organizational 
decision-makers on both (a) issues: the available repertoire of categories for making 
sense of the environment: problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the 
available repertoire of action alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and 
procedures (Ocasio, 1997). The attention based model, per Ocasio, emphasizes the 
distributed nature of organizational decisions, actions, and cognitions. 
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 Conceptual Assumptions. In applying the attention-based model to the board of 
directors and opportunity identification, the following assumptions and boundary 
conditions are necessary.  
1. The environment is a source of constant input and stimulus for the organization, 
but individuals and organizations have limited cognitive capabilities to deal with 
all available stimuli (Simon, 1947; (March & Simon, 1958)).  
2. The principle of selective attention is critical (Simon, 1947; (Hoffman & Ocasio, 
2001)). This principle suggests that individuals, organizations, and industries will 
selectively attend to some external events while ignoring others. 
3. Some of the hypotheses are at the individual level of analysis. This condition 
follows from the central assumption of Austrian economics which suggests that 
different people will discover different opportunities in a given context because 
they possess different prior knowledge (Kirzner, 1973). 
4. Board attention allocation and firm resource allocations are based on the 
decisions of individuals within the firm, an assumption that is consistent with 
research on top management teams (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
5. A “bounded rationality” model of human action and knowledge is adopted. This 
model permits the conceptualization of the environment and economic 
opportunity in terms of the information knowledge problem to be solved through 
effective search and action.   
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Contributions 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it gives 
researchers a glimpse into the boards’ attention tendencies and processes regarding value 
creation. In their introduction to the recent Academy of Management Review: special 
issue on corporate governance, editors Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) state that 
“directors’ reticence to invite researchers into the ‘black box’ of boardroom deliberations 
is understandable”. Directors fear that opening up boardroom activity to external 
scrutiny may also increase their risk of being subject to a shareholder lawsuit (Daily et 
al., 2003). Despite this difficulty, I have gained access to approximately 300 companies’ 
board minutes with an average of five sets of minutes per company per year for each of 
seven years.  
 Second, the study explores board impact on strategic entrepreneurship within the 
industrial context of firms. Most prior studies make the assumption that entrepreneurship 
is inherently a good action regardless of a firm’s situational or environmental context. 
This study is designed to consider contextual factors that may affect the value of 
strategic entrepreneurial attention by the board or strategic entrepreneurial actions by the 
firm. 
 Third, strategic entrepreneurship is a relatively new academic concept and, as 
such, has been subject to little empirical testing. Through the analysis of board minute 
text, trade journal text, and financial statements, this study explores the allocation of 
board attention and firm resources between leveraging existing competencies and 
pursuing future competencies. Within this contribution, the study investigates which 
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directors bring potential opportunities to the attention of the board, which directors agree 
or disagree with certain types of potential opportunities, and the process the directors go 
through in the evaluation of potential opportunities. 
 Finally, this study advances the current literature on board of directors from a 
collection of anecdotes and demographic inferences (such as insider/outsider ratio, age, 
gender, etc…) to an analysis of what is said, who says it, and how boards affect the 
allocation of firm resources.  
Overview of the Research Method 
 The theory and hypotheses developed in this study were tested using a sample of 
approximately 300 publicly traded firms. Building on the industry opportunity 
differences identified in Klevorick, Levin, Nelson and Winter (1995), three industries 
were chosen (rubber and plastics – low level of industry opportunity, furniture 
manufacturing – moderate level of industry opportunity, electronics – high level of 
industry opportunity) with disparate contexts of opportunity from 1994 through 2000. 
Klevorick et al. (1995) note that  entrepreneurial opportunities have been remarkably 
different in various industries. Strategic selection of certain industries sets the firms in 
distinct contexts. The analysis of board minutes reveals the situational strategic decision-
making context of the board of directors.   
 Data were collected from a combination of primary and secondary sources. The 
complete data set includes (1) information on firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions, 
(2) board-level attention allocation - including spatial, temporal and procedural 
dimensions of director communication, and (3) individual director-level experience and 
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background characteristics. Firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions were identified 
using content analysis of trade journals and reviews of firm financial documents. Board-
level attention allocation and the boards communication dimensions were identified 
through firm board minutes. Individual director experience was obtained from firm 
proxies and Dunn and Bradstreet.  Individual director experience and background 
characteristics were obtained from secondary sources. Hierarchical data analysis will be 
used to test the hypotheses generated from the theoretical framework of this study. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters II and III 
provide reviews of related literature. They focus on literature in two sub-areas: (a) board 
of directors’ composition, and (b) strategic entrepreneurship, Chapters II and III 
respectively. These chapters highlight the contributions and limitations of previous 
research in each of these areas and draw the two diverse literatures toward the concept of 
the board opportunity identification and evaluation.  Chapter IV develops theory and 
hypotheses concerning the attention of the board regarding strategic entrepreneurship 
and the firm actions that may or may not result. Chapter V provides a description of the 
research methods that are used to empirically test the hypotheses generated in Chapter 
IV. Sample selection, measurement issues, and statistical analysis techniques are 
discussed. Results of the empirical tests for the hypotheses are provided in Chapter VI. 
And in Chapter VII, discussions of the results are presented. Concluding this 
dissertation, Chapter VIII presents conclusions, limitations and implications of this 
study, as well as future research suggestions.  
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 CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND DIRECTOR ROLES 
 
Historical Overview of Boards of Directors – Form or Substance?   
Boards of Directors’ Increasing Relevance.  American corporations are required 
by the Revised View Business Corporation Act (1985) to have a board of directors that 
is responsible for all the business and affairs of the corporation.  If boards are to have 
any influence on a firm, they must have formal power to act and mechanisms by which 
they can utilize this power. Pfeffer (1981) defines power as the potential ability to 
influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get 
people to do things they would not otherwise do. Recently, we have seen the exercise of 
board power increase, possibly as a result of the corporate reform movement. Boards are 
exercising their latent power to make or approve critical decisions and to be more active 
in their governance of the corporation.  
Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985) identify two distinct trends in the 
corporate reform movement: the changing stockholder role and the growing awareness 
of board responsibilities. Considering the first trend, the role of stockholders has 
changed as the composition of stockholders has changed. Institutional investors have 
become the primary holders of stock, rather than individual stockholders. These material 
investors are more likely to closely scrutinize company operations and hold the board of 
directors accountable for corporate actions (Chaganti et al., 1985). For example, the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) has begun to withhold votes 
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for incumbent directors of companies with inadequate corporate governance policies and 
practices (Byrne & Grover, 1997).  
Historically, corporate power has been in the hands of the executives with the 
elected directors playing a relatively passive role, unless the firm’s financial condition 
deteriorated substantially over an extended time. More typically, when investors became 
dissatisfied with the firm, they had little recourse but to sell their stock. If enough people 
became dissatisfied with the firm’s performance, the firm’s stock price became 
depressed, and the firm may become a takeover candidate (Cadbury, 1999). Therefore, 
one way that ineffective executives were replaced was through takeovers.  
Institutional investors are beginning to react very differently to such situations. 
They are less likely to move quickly in and out of companies than individual 
shareholders because of the possible effects on stock price (Pound, 1993). Large stock 
trades for a firm, either buying or selling, will affect the stock price. Because of the lack 
of ability to easily buy or sell their positions, institutional investors are not only 
interested in the financial performance of the firm, but also the strategies of the firm 
(Pound, 1993). One method for these investors to actively manage their investments is to 
place a member on the company’s board of directors who can represent that investor’s 
financial and strategic interests. This appointment of owner power brings this discussion 
to the second trend in corporate reform, the evolution of board roles and responsibilities.     
Do Directors Matter? As noted above, the second trend in the corporate reform 
movement involves the evolving role and responsibilities of boards of directors. Early in 
the board literature, Mace (1971) found, through personal interviews with executives and 
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directors in large and medium sized companies, that the board’s participation in directing 
the corporation was minimal. Mace (1979) conducted a follow up study ten years later. 
He found that very little, if any, change had been made in corporate governance.  Much 
of the other early work on boards found that they were more inert than active 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983; Wolfson, 1984). Other 
studies have suggested that boards are most effective in times of crisis. However, their 
review of corporate and executive performance tended to be superficial (Clendenin, 
1972).  
In more recent research, boards of directors, and more specifically, board 
composition has been broadly explored in relation to: (1) firm value (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991), (2) perceived/actual agency problems resulting in lawsuits (Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990), (3) firm R&D expenditures (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991), (4) 
effect on stock price (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997), (5) board effectiveness (Kosnik, 
1987), (6) abnormal returns (Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, & Davidson, 1992), (7) equity-
based management compensation (Mehran, 1995), (8) financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996), (9) acquisitions (Byrd & Hickman, 1992), (10) ownership structure 
(Shivdasani, 1993), (11) adoption of poison pills (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994),  (12) 
CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988), (13) CEO selection (Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 
1996), (14) firm leadership structure and bankruptcy (Daily, 1995; Daily & Dalton, 
1994a, 1994b), (15) etc...  Despite the considerable amount of research concerning board 
composition and how directors affect firms, this literature has suffered from some 
important limitations.  
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A principle limitation of past board research is that most of it has been performed 
on large, mature, Fortune 500 firms. There is little board research on mid or small cap 
firms.  Some notable exceptions have been when a specific industry is selected for study; 
such as for profit hospitals (Boeker, 1992; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Provan, 1980, 1982), when firms that have filed for 
bankruptcy are examined (Daily, 1995; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Gales & 
Kesner, 1994), or when nonprofit organizations are examined (Bradshaw, Murray, & 
Wolpin, 1992).  Another significant limitation is the conflicting manner in which 
variables and constructs have been defined and measured across these studies, resulting 
in conflicting findings. 
Theoretical Perspectives of Board Composition 
 Introduction to Theoretical Perspectives.  In the search to discover what separates 
effective companies from ineffective ones, researchers have sought to identify board 
characteristics that distinguish the good from the bad.  Board composition refers to the 
experience, family relationships, employment history, and independence (insider-
outsider-affiliated) of board members.  Several theoretical approaches have been 
suggested as rationales for boards of directors’ roles: agency theory, legalistic 
perspective, resource dependence theory, class hegemony theory (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). More recently, board roles have been examined through stewardship theory 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), institutional theory and social network theory (Lynall, 
Golden, & Hillman, 2003). A majority of this research has centered on two theoretical 
perspectives: agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and resource dependence theory 
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(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Agency theory is appropriate for 
conceptualizing the control/monitoring role of directors. However, additional (and 
perhaps contrasting) theoretical perspectives are needed to explain directors’ resource, 
service, and strategy roles (Daily et al., 2003; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989).  
Lynall, Golden and Hillman (2003) suggest that it is not a question of if existing 
theories, in addition to agency theory, are helpful to understanding boards and firm 
performance. Rather, the key is when each is helpful. Due to their sparse application, the 
legalistic, class hegemony, stewardship, institutional and social network perspectives 
will only be briefly defined here (see Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Lynall et al (2003) 
for more detailed review of these perspectives). The legalistic perspective suggests that 
boards carry out their legal duty without interference in day-to-day operations (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). The class hegemony theory is based on political persuasion and suggests 
that boards perpetuate the interests of the ruling capitalist elite over other interests 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Stewardship theory contends that enhancing the board-
management ties and decision making by empowering managers of the firm will lead to 
better performance. Institutional theory posits that board composition will be determined 
largely by prevailing institutionalized norms in the organizational field and society 
(Lynall et al., 2003). Social network theory emphasizes the importance of network 
formation on reputation, trust, reciprocity, and mutual interdependence (Larson, 1992; 
Lynall et al., 2003).  
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Each of these four perspectives has driven research to look at the roles that 
boards play in influencing organizational effectiveness. Yet, as noted above, the 
prominent perspectives have been agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
Dalton and Daily (1999) call for research to directly examine the potential disconnect 
between agency theory and resource dependence theory. Therefore, the perspectives 
derived from these two theories will be my primary focus.  
Agency Theory’s View of Board Composition. Most of the recent studies 
concerning board composition have been developed within an agency perspective. The 
central hypothesis in these studies is that greater numbers of outside, independent 
directors are better for public corporations (Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2001).  
Based on agency theory and the empirical evidence derived from it over the past two 
decades, these researchers have suggested that the board should be comprised entirely of 
outsiders to ensure strong financial performance. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) 
note that the classification of outside directors, while not invariably consistent, most 
often relies on indicators of relationships (personal, professional, and/or economic) 
between the CEO and directors that may affect directors’ ability or willingness to 
disagree or challenge the CEO. When a director has a confounding relationship with the 
CEO, the director is typically classified as an insider. As one may imagine, this 
dichotomous classification represents two extremes that may not be accurate depictions 
of each director. Therefore, many studies have recognized that independence is more 
accurately depicted by more than one of two categories. Some of these studies classify 
certain directors, who appear to be less than independent but not completely 
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interdependent of the CEO, as affiliated directors.  Affiliated directors are defined as 
individuals who have a close relationship with the firm or the CEO and have a required 
disclosure on the proxy statement of their relationship because of Securities and 
Exchange Regulation 14A, Item 6(b). 
Agency theory essentially holds that the owners of the firm (stockholders) are 
exposed to the self-serving interests of the managers of the firm. Thus, the role of the 
directors is to serve as the agent of the owners to protect their interests. Agency theory 
typically has not considered stakeholders other than stockholders. A review of agency 
theory may help to understand why other stakeholders are frequently not considered 
when assessing the appropriateness of board members. 
 Agency theory is grounded in the assumption that there is a separation of 
ownership and control in public corporations (Berle & Means, 1932). This separation 
raises the possibility that the interests of the owners and managers may not be in 
alignment. The agency relationship has been described as, “a contract under which one 
or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency literature has developed along two lines, 
the positivist and the principal-agent literatures (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Jensen, 1983). The 
positivist literature is most germane to the study of corporate boards, as explained below. 
 Positivist agency theory focuses on identifying situations in which the principal 
and agent are likely to have conflicting goals, and then suggesting the governance 
mechanisms that can control the agent’s behavior (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989b; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Within the board 
literature, the study by Fama and Jensen (1983) is one of the more notable studies. They 
described the role of the board of directors as an information system that stockholders 
could use to monitor the opportunism of top executives. The positivist perspective 
implies that corporate boards should be comprised solely of outside, non-affiliated, 
independent directors. 
According to agency theory, full-time employees of the firm and individuals who 
have close personal or professional relationships with the CEO or the firm should be 
minimized when constructing a board (Dalton & Daily, 1999). Boards consisting 
primarily of insiders or dependent/compromised outside directors are considered to be 
less effective at monitoring due to their dependence on the organization. Independent 
boards, or those primarily consisting of independent outside directors, are thought to be 
the most effective at monitoring because their incentives are not compromised by 
dependence on the CEO or organization. Agency theory is primarily concerned with 
creating independent boards or in aligning the interests of directors with those of 
shareholders to ensure effective monitoring of management. Although the agency role 
may be an important one that boards fulfill, it may be useful for boards to perform other 
necessary functions, such as serving as an environmental interface. The resource 
dependency perspective may be an important way this occurs. After noting the empirical 
findings surrounding board composition from the agency perspective, I will review the 
resource dependency’s view of board composition and the often conflicting findings that 
have derived from this parallel topical stream of research.  
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Agency Theory’s Empirical Findings of Board Composition. Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson (1998) note that not one shred of evidence supports the relationship 
between board composition and corporate performance. Curiously, past studies have 
found both positive correlations (Pearce & Zahra, 1992) and negative correlations 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994) between board independence and firm performance. In their 
meta-analysis, Dalton et al. (1998) found that these variables were not related, 
irrespective of the manner board composition is measured and what performance 
measures are used. This meta-analysis was conducted in an attempt to determine the true 
relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Dalton et al.’s (1998) 
conclusion concerning the variables was derived because the studies were grounded 
within the agency framework. It hypothesizes that firm performance will be related to 
more outside, independent directors and not related to the skill sets that should be 
represented on the board, as the resource dependency perspective prescribes. 
 Other studies that have not looked explicitly at the agency prescriptions found a 
small positive relationship between board composition and firm performance (Rhoades 
et al., 2001). Rhoades et al. (2001) stated that their meta-analysis lends credibility to the 
idea that a supermajority of either inside or outside directors may be appropriate to 
enhance firm performance. 
Resource Dependence Theory’s View of Board Composition.  Resource 
dependency theory suggests that firms scan their environment to extract resources that 
allow the firm to enhance performance and increase its legitimacy in society (Pfeffer, 
1972, 1973; Price, 1963; Provan, 1980; Zald, 1967). In their (1999) study, Dalton and 
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Daily proposed that the resource-dependence role of board members is fundamental to 
the success of the firm. The theory, based in sociology (Selznick, 1949), assumes the 
organization is an open system (Katz & Kahn, 1966) and utilizes a contingency approach 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  The primary role of boards from a resource dependence 
perspective, therefore, is to serve as resource providers. This may include providing 
advice and counsel, legitimacy, channels for communicating information between the 
firm and external organizations, and assistance in obtaining resources or commitments 
from important elements outside the firm (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978).  
 In contrast to agency theorists, resource dependence theorists contend that 
boards are vehicles for co-opting important external organizations. An implication of 
resource dependence theory, then, is that each director may bring different linkages and 
resources to a board (Lynall et al., 2003).  Selznick (1949) found that organizations, 
when faced with opposition, could neutralize this opposition by placing representatives 
of the opposing groups on the organization’s board. He identified this process as 
“cooptation”. It is one example of how organizations attempt to find a fit between their 
organization and the environment and cope with environmental uncertainty. Cooptation 
is “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership policy-determining 
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” 
(Selznick, 1949). Boards can use cooptation strategies to reduce interorganizational 
dependencies and environmental uncertainty (Burt, 1979; Pfeffer, 1972). Based on the 
resource dependency perspective, the underlying patterns of board composition will be 
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more finely grained than the traditional insider/outsider distinction common in agency 
theory (Lynall et al., 2003).  
 Outside Directors from the Resource Dependence Perspective.  Pfeffer (1972) 
further refined the concept of cooptation as a tactic for managing interdependence. He 
found that board size and composition are systematically related to the organization’s 
need to deal with important external sectors in its environment. One of the ways that 
organizations can probe their environments is by appointing external representatives to 
the board of directors (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; Burt, 1980, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1991; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). 
 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) noted that one of the reasons outsiders are appointed 
to the board is to provide the organization with managerial and information skills not 
otherwise available to the organization. This practice may be particularly relevant to 
smaller organizations that are not able to generate all of their resources internally 
(Castaldi & Wortman, 1984). In addition to new ideas, external links and strategies, 
external directors may offer non path-dependent assessments on existing ideas and 
strategies in the organization.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organizational 
practices can become infused with value beyond the technical requirements at hand and 
can be adopted for the sake of legitimacy rather than improved performance.   
Synthesizing these ideas, independence from the CEO, the most valued effect of 
director independence from the agency perspective, may be only part of the value 
derived from director independence. Presumably, an outside director is independent of 
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the CEO as well as independent of the existing strategies and ideas already engrained 
within the firm. Therefore, a path-independent perspective on the direction and strategy 
of the firm offers perhaps more value to an already well governed organization. 
 Outside directors may provide a critical link to the external environment because 
of their access to valued resources and information. They may also be able to facilitate 
interfirm opportunities and initiatives. It is through the board that firms may discover 
potential environmental opportunities, such as new technological developments and 
changes in economic conditions. 
Overall Empirical Findings of Board Composition. Despite the ubiquity of 
empirical research dedicated to these board structure issues, the literature provides no 
consensus regarding the effects of board composition on performance (Daily, Johnson, 
& Dalton, 1999; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Empirical 
findings addressing the board’s impact on firm performance have been inconclusive 
(Bhagat & Black, 1999; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Kaplan, 1997; 
Patterson, 2000). See Figure 1 beginning on page 26 for a compilation of contradictory 
findings surrounding the relationship significance of board composition and firm 
performance. The lack of empirical support for theoretical views of boards and firm 
performance calls into question the applicability of existing theories to the phenomena of 
interest (Lynall et al., 2003).   Daily, Johnson, & Dalton (1999) summarize the many 
operationalizations of director independence that have been made in the boards 
literature: inside/outside, independent/interdependent, and affiliated. The incredulous 
  
25
parsing of these definitions, classifications, theoretical basis, and operationalizations 
may have contributed to the many inconsistencies in the board composition literature. 
Board Member Roles 
Introduction to Director Roles on the Board. Researchers have presented several 
roles that boards serve (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) labeled these roles as control, service and strategy. Johnson et al (1996) described 
two overlapping roles, service and control, and proposed resource dependence as a third 
role instead of strategy. The roles that board members play have evolved over time. 
Recognition of these different roles may help researchers better understand director 
responsibilities beyond the monitoring and control role.   
To explore these roles in further detail, I utilize the classification of Dalton and 
Daily (1999). It consists of three interrelated sets of roles - expertise and counsel, 
monitoring and control, and resource dependence. This typology of  roles is similar in 
nature, but not identical, with other proposed board role sets (Alexander, Fennel, & 
Halpern, 1993; Daily & Dalton, 1993; Johnson et al., 1996; Kesner & Johnson, 1990; 
Mace, 1971; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).   
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FIGURE 1  Emblematical Studies of Board Composition 
Findings  
Author 
(Year) 
Operationalization 
Of Board 
Composition 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Investigated 
Sign
+/- 
Relationship Detail 
Positive (Negative) Relationship Between Outside (Inside) Directors and Firm Performance 
Baysinger 
and Butler 
(1985) 
Independent outsider 
directors as a 
proportion of the board 
Relative financial 
performance 
(RFP) 
(ROE/industry 
avg.) 
 
 
 
+ 
Proportion of independent outside 
directors and: 
RFP 
Hill and 
Snell 
(1988) 
 
Insider directors as a 
proportion of the board 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
 
 
- 
Ratio of insiders to outsiders and:  
ROA 
Schellenger, 
Wood and 
Tashakori 
(1989) 
Outside directors as a 
proportion of the board 
ROA, ROE, RET 
and RET/STD 
RET – 
shareholder’s 
annualized total 
market return on 
investment. 
RET/STD – Risk-
adjusted 
shareholder’s 
annualized total 
market return on 
investment. 
 
 
+ 
NR 
 
 
NR 
 
+ 
 
Proportion of outside directors and: 
ROA 
ROE – No  significant relationship 
RET – No significant relationship 
RET/STD 
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1992) 
Outside directors as a 
proportion of the board 
ROA, ROE and 
P/E ratio (price 
earnings) 
 
 
NR 
 
 
NR 
 
+ 
Proportion of outside directors and: 
ROA – No significant relationship 
ROE – No significant relationship 
P/E ratio 
Pearce and 
Zahra 
(1992) 
Inside/Affiliated/Non 
Affiliated directors as a 
proportion of the board 
 
ROA, ROE, EPS 
and net profit 
margin 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
NR 
Proportion of affiliated and non-
affiliated directors and: 
ROA 
ROE 
EPS (Non affiliated twice as strong   
of an effect as affiliated for 
EPS) 
Net profit margin – No significant 
relationship 
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1993) 
Outside directors (not 
employed by firm) as a 
proportion of the board 
ROA, ROE and 
P/E ratio 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Proportion of outside directors and: 
ROA 
ROE  
P/E ratio  
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FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
Findings  
Author 
(Year) 
Operationalization 
Of Board 
Composition 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Investigated Sign +/- 
Relationship Detail 
Positive (Negative) Relationship Between Outside (Inside) Directors and Firm Performance 
Hambrick 
and 
D’Aveni 
(1992) 
Outside directors (directors who are 
not officers of the firm) as a 
proportion of the board 
Likelihood of filing a 
bankruptcy petition 
 
 
- 
 
Proportion of outside 
directors and: 
Likelihood of filing a 
bankruptcy petition 
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1994a) 
Inside/Affiliated/Outside 
Affiliated directors as a proportion 
of the board  
Likelihood of filing a 
bankruptcy petition 
 
 
 
- 
 
Proportion of 
affiliated directors 
and: 
Bankruptcy 
Daily and 
Dalton 
(1994b)  
Inside/Interdependent/ 
Independent directors as a 
proportion of the board 
Likelihood of filing a 
bankruptcy petition 
 
 
 
 
- 
Proportion of 
independent 
(outside) directors 
and: 
Likelihood of 
bankruptcy 
Daily  
(1995) 
Inside/Affiliated/ 
Independent directors as a 
proportion of the board 
Bankruptcy 
reorganization and 
bankruptcy 
liquidation 
 
 
+ 
- 
 
Proportion of outside 
directors and: 
Reorganization 
Liquidation 
 
Daily 
(1996) 
Outside directors as a proportion of 
the board 
Likelihood of filing a 
prepackaged 
bankruptcy 
 
 
+ 
 
Proportion of outside 
directors and: 
Likelihood of 
prepackaged      
bankruptcy filing 
  
28
 
FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
Findings  
Author 
(Year) 
Operationalization 
Of Board 
Composition 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Investigated Sign+/- 
Relationship Detail 
Positive (Negative) Relationship Between Inside (Outside) Directors and Firm Performance 
Vance 
(1978) 
Inside/Outside directors 
(Outsiders are external 
executives or directors 
serving the interests of 
special interest groups 
ROI, ROE and 
Changes in Fortune’s 
500 rankings 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
Proportion of inside directors 
and: 
ROI, ROE and rankings 
 
Proportion of outside 
directors and: 
ROI, ROE and rankings 
 
Cochran, 
Wood and 
Jones 
(1985) 
Insider directors as a 
proportion of the board. 
Insiders are measured the 
following three ways: 
1) Current employees 
2) Current and past 
employees 
3) Current and past 
employees and 
affiliated directors 
 
ROA, ROE, Net 
profit margin, Firm’s 
assets (Fair Market 
Value – Book Value) 
normalized sales 
 
+ 
Each of the three 
measurements of insider 
directors had positive 
correlations with all four 
performance measures. 
Kesner 
(1987) 
Inside directors as a 
proportion of the board 
ROA, ROE and 
lagged total returns 
to investors 
 
 
+ 
Proportion of inside directors 
and: 
ROA, ROE and subsequent 
total returns to investors 
Agrawal 
and 
Knoeber 
(1996) 
Outsider directors as a 
proportion of the board. 
Outsiders measured as any 
nonemployee director 
Tobin’s Q - Proportion of outside 
directors and Tobin’s Q 
 
Yermack 
(1996) 
Inside/Outside/Grey 
directors each as a 
proportion of the board 
Tobin’s Q NR 
 
+ 
 
NR 
Proportion of inside directors 
and Tobin’s Q 
Proportion of outside 
directors and Tobin’s Q 
Proportion of grey directors 
and Tobin’s Q 
Rosenstein 
and Wyatt 
(1997) 
 
Inside directors who are 
also members of 
management as a 
proportion of the board 
Cumulative abnormal 
market returns 
+ When management owns 5% 
- 25% of the company’s 
outstanding stock, the 
announcement of an inside 
director appointment results 
in positive market returns. 
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FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
Findings  
Author 
(Year) 
Operationalization 
Of Board 
Composition 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Investigated Sign
+/- 
Relationship Detail 
No Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance 
Schmidt 
(1975) 
Inside/Outside/Affiliated 
directors as proportions of the 
board 
Current ratio, 
working 
capital/sales dollar, 
LT debt ratio, and 
ROE 
 
 
NR 
No significant 
relationships between 
board composition and 
any of the performance 
measures.  
Chaganti, 
Mahajan 
and Sharma 
(1985) 
Outside directors as a 
proportion of the board 
Likelihood of filing 
a bankruptcy 
petition 
 
 
NR 
No significant 
relationship between the 
proportion of outside 
directors and the 
likelihood of filing a 
bankruptcy petition. 
Davis 
(1991) 
Insider directors, who are  
executives of the firms, as a 
proportion of the board  
Market returns 
(adjusted per 
industry) 
 
NR 
No significant 
relationship between the 
proportion of insiders 
and market returns. 
Hermalin 
and 
Weisbach 
(1991) 
Outside directors as a 
proportion of the board 
(Inside/Grey/Outside) 
Tobin’s Q  
NR 
No significant 
relationship between 
outside director 
proportion and Tobin’s 
Q. 
Mallette and 
Fowler 
(1992) 
Independent directors as a 
proportion of the board 
ROE  
NR 
No significant 
relationship between 
independent directors 
and ROE. 
Dalton, 
Daily, 
Ellstrand 
and Johnson 
(1998) 
Meta-Analysis: Various 
classifications and 
operationalizations of board 
composition 
Meta-Analysis: 
Various 
performance 
measurements 
 
NR 
No significant 
relationships between 
board composition and 
firm performance. 
Wagner, 
Stimpert and 
Fubara 
(1998) 
Meta-Analysis: Various 
classifications and 
operationalizations of board 
composition 
Meta-Analysis: 
Various 
performance 
measurements 
  
NR 
Both inside director 
proportion of a board and 
outsider proportion of a 
board were found to be 
significantly positive. 
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 Expertise and Counsel (Strategy/Service).  Lorsch and MacIver (1989) asserted 
that directors should provide expert advice and counsel to the CEO. Some theorists 
suggest that a great deal of a director’s responsibility is to provide expert advice to the 
CEO (Alibrandi, 1985; Carpenter, 1988; Mace, 1971; Mintzberg, 1983; Useem, 1993). 
One critical service that board members perform is the evaluation of shareholder 
concerns. According to Charan (1998), a good board uses its experience and 
sophistication to make independent assessments of shareholder concerns. With 
institutional investors owning and controlling 56 percent of outstanding shares traded on 
all major exchanges (Edwards, 2000; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), it is 
useful to assess which shareholders are true, long-term owners and which shareholders 
are speculative investors who seek short-term gains.  
 Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) note that directors, whether insiders or 
outsiders, concern themselves with the effectiveness of their firm’s strategy. Directors 
recognize that the firm’s performance directly impacts perceptions of their individual 
performance. From the firm’s perspective, outside directors have been found to increase 
board participation in strategic decision making with a focus on increasing institutional 
responsiveness and strategic adaptation (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). The expertise of the 
outside directors may allow them to provide valuable insights to the CEO and the firm 
regarding strategic decisions (Andrews, 1981; Berenbeim, 1996). Judge and Zeithaml’s 
(1992) study was the first direct investigation of actual board behavior. They applied 
convergent insights of institutional and strategic choice perspectives to explain board 
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involvement in strategic decision making. They concluded that both perspectives appear 
to be necessary to describe and explain the board’s strategic role. 
Monitor and Control (Governance).   In performing its monitoring and control 
role, a board: (1) sets the premises of managerial decision-making, (2) sets limits within 
which management must act, and (3) attempts to align the interests of senior executives 
with those of its shareholders (Mizruchi, 1983b). The board serves as the ultimate 
oversight body. Thus, it needs to have sufficient information, audit, and control systems 
in place. These systems help to communicate to the board and senior management 
whether the firm is meeting its business objectives (Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) prompted an extensive exploration into the impact of 
board composition on its ability to effectively monitor top management.  This call to 
research has been heeded, perhaps at the expense of examining and gaining an 
understanding on the other roles boards play. Most governance theories identify the 
monitoring and control role as conceptually and normatively important (Bainbridge, 
1993; Johnson et al., 1996; Mizruchi, 1983a; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Legalistic 
perspectives suggest that the primary purpose of a board is to act in a fiduciary role. This 
role involves monitoring management for the benefit of the shareholders and the 
corporation (Bainbridge, 1993; Budnitz, 1990; Cieri, Sullivan, & Lennox, 1994; Johnson 
et al., 1996; Miller, 1993). Why the overwhelming emphasis on director independence. 
In brief, the oversight (control) function of the board is often suggested as the most 
critical of directors’ roles (Mizruchi, 1983a; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
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 The board of directors’ role in corporate control is best exemplified by the 
selection of the chief executive officer and other senior executives. Corporate law in the 
United States requires all business of public traded companies be conducted under the 
direction of a board of directors (Eisenberg, 1976). The board fulfills its monitoring role 
by ratifying major policy decision, hiring and firing a  firm’s management team, and 
determining the compensation of a firm’s top managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
board has responsibility to make sure the firm has a high caliber CEO and well-informed 
senior managers (Conger et al., 1998).  
The independence of outside directors is a very attractive attribute for many of 
the roles directors need to fulfill. However, independence is not without weaknesses. 
Patton and Baker (1987) noted that few directors put much of their own funds at risk. 
This lack of financial commitment to the firm could mean that the interests of the board 
of directors are not aligned with those of the many stockholders. Accordingly, this could 
result in an agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983), even though the board members are 
independent. Monks and Minow (1996) suggested that many outside and independent 
directors are not qualified to perform their roles properly. The independent directors may 
lack relevant experience to the firm or the basic skills to perform the roles required of 
directors. 
 The control role is where most of the agency-based research has resided. 
However, this role is too narrow to explain the full functioning of corporate boards. 
Although independence may be a legitimate concern, other roles fulfilled by the board 
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should be addressed. A board could be completely independent and still fail in its other 
roles (Dalton & Daily, 1999). 
Resource Dependence (Resource Access). This section briefly reiterates the 
primary components of this role because they have been reviewed previously in this 
manuscript. The resource dependence role of board members provides a link to the 
external environment (Dalton & Daily, 1999). This role fosters access to critical assets, 
capabilities and information that may not otherwise be available to the firm (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Some of the resources may be represented by independent directors. In 
addition, affiliated directors can provide these resources as well (Afuah, 2000; Dalton & 
Daily, 1999). Industry representatives on the board may also be helpful to the firm in 
finding out about new technological developments within their field (Afuah, 2000). 
Resource dependency is often an overlooked area of board research (Dalton & Daily, 
1999).  
Hybrid and Other Roles.   As one may imagine, one director can serve more than 
one of the aforementioned roles for an organization. However, each director may have 
his or her own portfolio of role competencies that prompted his/her recruitment and 
subsequent election to the board.  
Summary 
 A review of the board composition and director roles literatures reveals only a 
few consistencies. One consistency is the increasing importance of boards of directors to 
the investors they are supposed to serve. There is little consensus, theoretically or 
empirically, on the extent of board responsibilities or the type of roles that directors 
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should invoke. Of course, investors are increasingly becoming more knowledgeable and 
proactive about their investments. Most of these investors are now institutional investors 
that don’t move in and out of investments with ease. Thus, directors, as representatives 
of the owners, are being held more accountable. Another consistency in these literatures 
appears to be the importance of context on both board composition and director roles. 
There appear to be few studies that explicitly portray the unique nature of the board’s 
situational and contextual environments. This study posits that the environment in which 
a board conducts itself is a critical factor in defining effective board composition and 
board roles.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
REVIEW OF STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Overview of Strategic Entrepreneurship 
 From the Fragmented Domain of Entrepreneurship Research. The study of 
entrepreneurship is limited by both the absence of an unambiguous paradigm and the 
lack of definitional consensus.  These limitations can be attributed to the relative 
newness of entrepreneurship as a field of academic investigation. In the context of 
Kuhn’s (1970) ‘the nature of normal science’, the entrepreneurship field is in a 
preparadigmatic state. That is, a variety of paradigms are competing to address the 
problems of the field. One clear indicator that entrepreneurship is still in a 
preparadigmatic state is the absence of a definitive core question. For example, strategic 
management, though it too is in a state of preparadigmatic development, has evolved to 
generally ask the following core question: ‘why does one firm perform better than 
another?’.    
 To move beyond core questions centered on the field’s definitional 
inconsistencies, scholars must adopt and explicitly state the definitions of choice for 
their study. In this vein, one of the more specific definitions as of late, and the one that 
will be relied on in this dissertation, is presented by Venkataraman (1997).   According 
to Venkataraman (1997), entrepreneurship is explaining the discovery, evaluation and 
development of opportunities. Considering this conceptualization, the field involves the 
study of:  (1) sources of opportunities; (2) the processes of discovery, evaluation, and 
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exploitation of opportunities; and (3) implicitly the set of individuals who discover, 
evaluate, and exploit them.   
 Kirzner (1973; 1979) suggests that the central role of the entrepreneur is to find 
and exploit opportunities by taking advantage of economic disequilibria. This is 
achieved by recognizing or knowing things that others do not. Kirzner (1979) notes that 
entrepreneurs do not have to possess specific knowledge themselves. They may be able 
to recognize how other people’s knowledge, experience, and expertise can be harnessed 
and employed in a new configuration for profit.  Accordingly, the substance of 
entrepreneurial activity is the recognition of possibility and opportunity. An opportunity 
results from factors that are both within the control of the entrepreneur (e.g., 
background, experience) and outside the control of the entrepreneur (contextual and 
environmental factors). It may be an incremental (Kirznerian) opportunity or a radical 
(Schumpeterian) opportunity to the market.  The principle challenge of entrepreneurial 
opportunity research is examining when an idea becomes an executable opportunity. An 
attempt to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity involves developing a strategy and 
acquiring and managing the necessary resources to capitalize on the opportunity. 
 In recent years, scholars have been debating whether the domain of 
entrepreneurship as the foundation of wealth creation should focus on: (1) newness and 
novelty in the form of new products, new processes, and new markets as the drivers of 
wealth creation (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton, 2002; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996b; 
Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002) or, (2) alternatively, the 
discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities. Despite this divergence, both 
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perspectives concur that opportunity recognition and creation is at the heart of 
entrepreneurship (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003; McCline, Bhat, & Baj, 2000). 
Defining Strategic Entrepreneurship.  As noted, opportunity recognition 
(discovery), evaluation and commercialization appear to be emerging as a specific focus 
within entrepreneurship research.  Consequently, many scholars have explored 
opportunities in the context of new ventures. However, capitalizing on opportunities is 
not the unique domain of new business, but rather business in general. Established 
businesses must also consider their “strategies” for identifying, evaluating, and 
commercializing new opportunities.  
When referring to established business and entrepreneurship, prior literature has 
a mixed terminology that naturally straddles the entrepreneurship and the strategic 
management research domains. The term ‘strategic entrepreneurship’ derives from the 
terms that follow. Strategic actions are those through which companies develop and 
exploit current competitive advantages while supporting entrepreneurial initiatives that 
exploit opportunities to help create competitive advantages for the firm in the future. 
Through entrepreneurial actions, companies identify and then seek to exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities that rivals have not noticed or fully exploited (Hitt et al., 
2002; Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001). Entrepreneurial opportunities are external 
conditions that suggest the viability of introducing and selling new products, services, 
raw materials and organizing methods at prices exceeding their production costs 
(Casson, 1982; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Entrepreneurial opportunities exist 
because of information asymmetries through which different actors develop separate 
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beliefs regarding the relative value of resources as well as the potential future value of 
those resources that follow from their transformation of inputs into outputs (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2002; Kirzner, 1973; Schumpeter, 1934; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  
Strategic entrepreneurship is the integration of opportunity-seeking actions with 
advantage-seeking actions for the purpose of designing and implementing initiatives to 
create wealth (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001).   
 Entrepreneurial and strategic actions are complementary, not interchangeable 
(McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Meyer & Heppard, 2000).  Entrepreneurial action using a 
strategic perspective is helpful in identifying the most appropriate opportunities for a 
firm to pursue and in facilitating the exploitation to establish competitive advantages. 
Entrepreneurs may identify and exploit opportunities that create or establish temporary 
rather than sustainable competitive advantages. This occurs primarily when 
entrepreneurs fail to manage resources strategically, making it difficult to sustain the 
competitive advantages developed (Hitt et al., 2001). Therefore, both opportunity-
seeking (i.e., entrepreneurship) and advantage-seeking (i.e., strategic management) 
behaviors are necessary for wealth creation, yet neither alone is sufficient (Amit & Zott, 
2001; Hitt & Ireland, 2000; Ireland et al., 2003; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000).   
 Some firms are able to identify opportunities, but unable to develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage. Other firms are able to build competitive advantages but lose 
their ability to identify valuable entrepreneurial opportunities. Both sets of firms are 
unlikely to sustain competitive advantages over the long term. As such, they will 
discontinue creating wealth for their owners. Therefore, all firms, new and established, 
  
39
small and large, must engage in both opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking 
behaviors (Ireland et al., 2003). 
 Opportunity-Seeking at the Strategic Level.  Most business environments have 
become increasingly competitive, complex and uncertain in recent years. The dynamic 
environments in which many firms operate contain a wide variety of potential threats 
and opportunities to firms. There are threats to existing patterns of successful 
competition as well as opportunities to form competitive advantages through innovations 
that create new industries and markets. This new landscape is characterized by: (1) 
substantial and often frame-breaking change; (2) a series of temporary, rather than 
sustainable competitive advantages for individual firms; (3) the criticality of speed in 
making and implementing strategic decisions; (4) shortened product life cycles; (5) and 
new forms of competition among global competitors (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt, 2000; 
Hitt et al., 2001, 2002; Hitt, Keats, & Demarie, 1998; Ireland & Hitt, 1999). Hamel 
(2000) suggests that this new, more competitive landscape’s characteristics combine and 
interact to create an environment in which revolutionaries (entrepreneurial actors) have 
the potential to: (1) capture existing markets in some instances while creating new ones 
in others, (2) acquire market share from less aggressive and innovative competitors, and 
(3) take the customers, assets, and even the employees of staid existing firms (Hitt et al., 
2002). Consequently, complacency around a firm’s competitive advantage carries a 
serious risk of having that very competency usurped.  
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Pursuing Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 Scholars have traditionally confined the study of entrepreneurship to the acts of a 
single individual. In many settings, entrepreneurship is a firm-level phenomenon 
(Burgelman, 1983, 1984; Covin, 1991; Jennings & Lumpkin, 1989; Kuratko, Montagno, 
& Hornsby, 1990; Miller, 1983).  Kanter (1989), Reich (1987) and Kruglianskas and 
Thamhain (2000) have all observed that in the corporate environment, entrepreneurship 
is not accomplished by an individual, but rather in a large organization.  Implementation 
of corporate entrepreneurship strategies is important and can play a major role in the 
success (or lack thereof) of efforts to produce innovation in firms (Hitt, Nixon, 
Hoskisson, & Kochhar, 1999). 
 Corporate entrepreneurship is viewed as important for organizational survival, 
profitability, growth, and renewal (Zahra, 1996). In prior corporate entrepreneurship 
research, scholars have explored the mere presence of the ‘corporate entrepreneurship’ 
construct and performance, top management teams, inside/outside directors, etc... 
However, the causal nature of these associations has typically remained unexplained.  
The perception of opportunity is suggested to propel a firm’s decision makers to invest 
limited resources toward the development of new competencies, invariably at the 
expense of existing competencies. If opportunities lead to the investments and actions 
that make up the construct ‘corporate entrepreneurship’, why are some firms better at 
identifying opportunities than others?    
 Finding Opportunities. When studying opportunity recognition, a critical 
assumption is that opportunities are developed through planning, rather than destined by 
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happenstance.  Whether opportunities are recognized through systematic search or 
simply by luck has often been debated in the literature.  In recent years, some researchers 
have theorized that people do not search for opportunities. Rather, they happen to 
recognize the value of new information that they happen to receive.    Kirzner (1997) 
distinguishes ‘accidental opportunity discovery’ from ‘successful systematic search’.  He 
notes that ‘accidental opportunity discovery’ involves the surprise that accompanies the 
realization that one had overlooked something that was readily available (Ardichvili, 
Cardozo, & Ray, 2003).  This discovery results from heightened entrepreneurial 
alertness. Alternatively, the entrepreneur is in a mode sometimes alternatively referred to 
as ‘passive search’. In this mode, the entrepreneur is receptive, though not engaged in a 
formal, systematic search process. Koller (1988) reported that most entrepreneurs 
recognized, rather than sought the opportunities for their firms (Ardichvili et al., 2003).  
 Pluralistic Perspectives of Opportunity.  There are different conceptualizations of  
“opportunity” (Kirzner, 1973; McMullan & Long, 1990; Schumpeter, 1934; Timmons, 
1994).  A review of prior opportunity-related literature demonstrates the diversity in the 
conceptualization of an opportunity, including: (1) a “situation” (Stevenson, Roberts, & 
Grousbeck, 1989), (2) economic “disequilibria” (Kirzner, 1973), (3) an “idea leading to 
a business concept” (Bhave, 1994), and (4) a new “production function” (Schumpeter, 
1934). For the purposes of this research, an opportunity is the potential to meet a market 
need, interest, or want through a creative combination of resources to deliver superior 
value (Casson, 1982; Kirzner, 1973; Schumpeter, 1934).  In its most elemental form, an 
“opportunity” may appear as an “imprecisely-defined market need, or un- or under-
  
42
employed resources or capabilities” (Kirzner, 1979). Underutilized or underemployed 
resources, as well as new capabilities or technologies, may offer the potential to create 
and deliver new value for prospective customers. The precise form that this new value 
will take may be undefined.   
 Numerous views of opportunity recognition and/or development have been 
presented in recent years (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Bhave, 1994; De Koning & Muzyka, 
1999; Singh, 2001).  These views are based on different, often conflicting assumptions 
that are borrowed from a variety of disciplines, ranging form cognitive psychology to 
Austrian economics. 
 The view of an entrepreneurial opportunity from an economic perspective 
suggests that a market imperfection exists or that an economic disequilibrium can be 
exploited by bringing the market into a state of equilibrium (Kirzner, 1973; 1979). 
Kirzner (1973) contends that opportunities exist due to the “ignorance of the original 
market participants”. Entrepreneurs are those rare individuals who take advantage of 
these market inefficiencies by knowing or recognizing things that others do not. His 
view posits that opportunities exist all around us in time and space. It is only those 
individuals with “alertness” who have the ability to recognize them.  
 Kirzner’s formulation has been criticized, however, for a lack of attention to 
uncertainty. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not 
sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest 
resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity (Klein, 1999). In Kirzner’s 
formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an 
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existing profit opportunity. He further suggests that entrepreneurs can earn losses when 
they misread market conditions. In brief, Kirzner views the entrepreneur as a market 
actor who capitalizes on the existence of disequilibrium in a market. 
In contrast, Schumpeter (1934) views the role of the entrepreneur as a radical 
market innovator. He describes the vital societal contribution of the entrepreneur as 
being the instigator of “creative destruction” through innovation. Schumpeter (1934) 
contends that industries within economies are replaced by other industries over time. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) illustrate the Schumpeterian view of creative destruction 
through research findings which suggest that long periods of incremental changes to 
markets are broken by technological (radical) discontinuities.  
 Consistent with Schumpeter, Drucker (1985) stresses the importance of 
innovation to opportunity. He suggests that innovation is “the specific tool of 
entrepreneurs, the means by which they exploit change as an opportunity for a different 
business or different service”. Drucker’s conception of entrepreneurial opportunity is, 
therefore, consistent with Schumpeter’s, as it changes the equilibrium point of the 
market.  
 Building Firm-Level Opportunistic Strategy.  Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
firms identify and exploit opportunities that rivals have not observed or have 
underexploited (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). To build and maintain a competitive 
advantage through which entrepreneurial opportunities can be identified and exploited, 
firms must hold or have access to heterogeneous and idiosyncratic resources that current 
and potential rivals cannot easily duplicate (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991).   
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 In the past decade, entrepreneurship researchers have focused on 
entrepreneurship as a process [e.g., Bull & Willard [, 1993 #7998]; Bygrave & Hofer 
(1991); Covin & Slevin (1991); Gartner (1989);(1996b)]. Opportunity recognition may 
be the critical first step of the process (Hills, 1995; Timmons, Muzyka, Stevenson, & 
Bygrave, 1987). Bygrave (1989) and Stephenson and Jarillo-Mossi (1986) view 
entrepreneurship as the process of creating value by combining resources to exploit an 
opportunity. And, the pursuit of the opportunity may occur regardless of resources 
controlled.  
 In effort to identify entrepreneurial opportunities, Alvarez and Barney (2002) 
highlight the importance of entrepreneurial alertness as an entrepreneurial resource. In 
particular, they call on Kirzner’s (1973) views that entrepreneurs often have special 
insight into potential market disequilibrium opportunities. But, where does this ‘insight’ 
come from? As noted above, some scholars have suggested an entrepreneur’s, or an 
entrepreneurial firm’s, acquired knowledge and experiences contribute materially to 
‘insight’. Knowledge, which is justified true belief, is a critical intangible resource that 
helps firms identify and especially exploit opportunities to establish competitive 
advantages (von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000).  Sharma and Chrisman (1999) also 
purport that new knowledge is vital to organizational renewal.  However, it is a delicate 
balance that must be concerned with the equally important tasks of simultaneously 
exploring (e.g., experimentation, discovery, and flexibility) for new knowledge and 
exploiting (e.g., efficiency, refinement, and execution) existing knowledge to create 
wealth (March, 1991). 
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 Alertness and Asymmetry. Entrepreneurial alertness has typically been used to 
study individuals who identify new business venture opportunities. Though 
entrepreneurial attention is the construct applied in this dissertation, the two concepts 
share many similarities. However, entrepreneurial attention attempts to not only consider 
an individual or group’s prior experiences and knowledge in their awareness, but also 
factors in an individual or group’s dimensional limitations. For example, though an 
individual may have the knowledge to be alert or recognize an opportunity, she may not 
have the time in order to process the recognition.                 
 Taking into account the importance of entrepreneurial alertness in prior literature, 
the remainder of this literature review will explore the applicability of entrepreneurial 
alertness and one of its specific components, information asymmetry in entrepreneurial 
strategies. Entrepreneurial identification occurs when entrepreneurial alertness exceeds a 
threshold level. Alertness is likely to be heightened when there is a confluence of several 
factors: (1) certain personality traits (creativity and optimism), (2) relevant prior 
knowledge and experience (providing information asymmetry), and (3) social networks 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003).  Entrepreneurial alertness is the propensity to notice and be 
sensitive to information about objects, incidents, and patterns of behavior in the 
environment with special sensitivity to maker and user problems, unmet needs and 
interests, and novel combinations of resources (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Bhide, 1996). 
Further, in keeping with several scholars, personality characteristics and the environment 
interact to create conditions that foster higher entrepreneurial alertness (Ardichvili et al., 
2003; Gaglio & Taub, 1992; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Sathe, 1989; Shapero, 1975). 
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 The assumption is that the more alert one is, the more likely an opportunity will 
be recognized. However, Busenitz (1996) conducted an empirical test of Kaish and 
Gilad’s (1991) proposition that entrepreneurs are more alert to new opportunities and use 
information differently from managers. He found little empirical support for this 
proposition. Busenitz concluded that the measures of entrepreneurial alertness need 
further development. 
 One component of entrepreneurial alertness that has recently received much 
attention from scholars is information asymmetry and prior knowledge. Based in 
Austrian Economics, Hayek (1945) contends that entrepreneurship exists because of 
information asymmetry between different actors. Examining how individuals 
acknowledge and understand new information, Von Hippel (1994) suggests that people 
tend to notice information that is related to information they already know.  Shane 
(2000) draws from both of these prior works. He asserts that entrepreneurs will discover 
opportunities because prior knowledge triggers recognition of the value of the new 
information. Shane (2000) found that any given entrepreneurial opportunity is not 
obvious to all potential entrepreneurs (the rationale being that all people do not possess 
the same knowledge at the same time; Kirzner, 1997). This study also suggests that each 
person’s idiosyncratic prior knowledge creates a “knowledge corridor”. This corridor 
allows him/her to recognize certain opportunities, but not others (Hayek, 1945). Three 
major dimensions of prior knowledge are important to the process of entrepreneurial 
discovery: (1) prior knowledge of markets, (2) prior knowledge of ways to serve 
markets, and (3) prior knowledge of customer problems.   
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Summary 
 An explanation of the discovery and development of opportunities is a key part 
of entrepreneurship research (Venkataraman, 1997).  Elements of opportunities may be 
recognized, intentionally or accidentally. However, the realization of the potential value 
from opportunities is a task that requires strategic forethought. Careful investigation of 
and sensitivity to market needs, as well as an ability to spot suboptimal deployment of 
resources, may help an entrepreneur begin to develop an opportunity (Ardichvili et al., 
2003).  Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray (2003) suggest that “opportunity development” 
rather than “opportunity recognition” or “opportunity perception” should be the principle 
focus of this stream of research. The mere recognition or perception of opportunity 
cannot become a viable business without development. These scholars emphasize the 
opportunity development process. They examine entrepreneurial identification, 
evaluation, and development as a continuous stream of events. 
This idea of ‘opportunity development’ brings this literature review of strategic 
entrepreneurship full circle. Opportunity seeking is likely to have the greatest impact in 
established organizations when undertaken at the strategic level. At this level, 
organizational planning and resource allocation occurs. It does not matter whether one 
ascribes to the propositions that opportunities exist and are waiting to be discovered or, 
alternatively, that opportunities are created. The key is that those managing the 
organization have the greatest ability to create a firm-level strategy that garners the 
highest probability of developing opportunities.    
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES BUILDING 
 
 Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1991)  suggest that explaining how firms behave is 
one of the fundamental issues or questions that define the field of strategy, its priorities 
and concerns, and the contribution it makes to the theory and practice of management. In 
particular, explaining how firms behave allows us to comprehend whether and when 
firms are able to adapt to changing environments, whether they successfully change their 
strategies and capabilities, or whether they fail to respond adequately to competition 
(Ocasio, 1997).  Seeking explanations of firm behaviors and adaptations to changing 
environments is more important today than ever before, as today’s business environment 
is in constant flux. No industry is immune from radical restructuring and external 
discontinuities. Threats and opportunities can arise from anywhere. Too often 
management is blindsided by such discontinuities.  
 Here, I suggest that most companies view the world from the inside out. That is, 
they tend to assess their own capabilities first, compare themselves to their traditional 
peers within traditional industry boundaries, and convince themselves that incremental 
improvement along the usual measures is the best way to move forward. The inherent 
limitation of this inside-out perspective is that it beseeches outside perspectives. 
Consultants and new employees are able to provide distinct, valuable perspectives. 
However, each has their limitations. Consultants may have little incentive beyond their 
fee to see that a company’s strategy is successful. Also, consultants may offer a very 
general level of strategic advice that isn’t sufficiently fitted to the organization’s 
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competencies and overall direction. Deviation between an organization’s strategic plan 
and the organization’s subsequent performance can be, and often is, attributed to causal 
ambiguity. Therefore, despite selling expertise that may be ineffective, the long term 
reputation of the consultants may not be damaged at all. New employees can initially 
offer a unique, outsider’s perspective while they are gaining an understanding of more 
firm specific information. Of course, over time employees will become socialized and 
adopt perspectives that are more congruent with the organization’s status quo. In light of 
these limitations, the most valuable perspectives for environment-organization fit may 
come from other boundaries of the firm.  
 In this chapter, it is proposed that the board offers a distinctive perspective that 
may be both well informed regarding the organization and partially independent of the 
firm’s socialization.  The placement of the board at the boundary of the firm is not the 
only characteristic that gives the, especially outside, board members an advantageous, 
value-creating position. They also provide an important intersection between the firm 
and its environment.  It is the combination of quality outsiders with knowledgeable 
insiders, who know the day-to-day strategists and convey firm specific information to 
outside board members, which gives the board such potential to create firm value.  
Boards can provide management with a valuable service by viewing the broader 
business landscape and helping management to recognize major opportunities and 
discontinuities that will affect the firm. When it comes to an environmental shift, boards 
can be especially helpful in identifying blind spots where the top management’s 
experience base is lacking.  
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 The power of the board as a competitive resource depends on the quality and 
diversity of directors. Without the right composition, the dialogue may never ensue; the 
board’s competitive power may never get released.  Boards are in a structural position 
that not only allows them the ability to comprehend the firm’s value creating 
competencies (insider perspective), but also are able to assess the firm’s environmental 
opportunities and threats with legitimacy, value and relevance to the organization 
(outsider’s independent perspective). The order that such issues are addressed on a board 
agenda, if the item makes it onto the agenda, results from the cultural, social, and 
economic forces that govern the attention of the board.  Outside the board room, 
directors are likely to allocate attention to environmental stimuli associated with highly 
valued issues that serve to enhance their interests and identities. Consequently, each 
director may have a unique perspective on issues inside, tangential to, and outside the 
firm. Each issue’s relevance to the firm and the board’s attention may be specific to the 
individual director’s perspective. 
 More than ever, outside directors influence the process of nominating new board 
members (Charan, 1998). In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which was signed into law by President Bush on July 20, 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley applies 
to U.S. publicly-owned companies. The provisions for restructuring company board of 
directors have a 24 month phase-in period. In tandem, the New York Stock Exchange 
and the Nasdaq are now requiring each listed company to have a board composed of a 
majority of independent directors. 
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 In addition, the NYSE recently ruled that a listed company will be required to 
have a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent 
directors. Nasdaq will not require listed companies to have a nominating/corporate 
governance committee, but it will require all director nominations to be approved by 
either an independent compensation committee or a majority of the independent 
directors. To accommodate these new rules, board nominating committees are working 
with search firms and extending the invitation to new members.  
 As noted in chapter II, prior literature recognizes that directors sometimes serve 
as an interface between the firm and its environment in the acquisition of needed 
resources (resource dependence).  The resources provided by a director may be access to 
financial, political, social, or human capital. Clearly, the director’s specific human 
capital, such as expertise in a specific domain, is valuable. In addition, the general 
knowledge that directors possess may be just as valuable through identifying new 
opportunities and potential threats. By combining the specific knowledge of the inside 
directors with the typically broad strategic knowledge and experience of the outside 
directors, a unique situational environment may be created in the boardroom that can 
identify relevant opportunities that appear outside the ‘field of vision’ of insiders alone. 
Pattern of Organizational Attention: Beginning with the Board 
 In 1947, Simon  first proposed a new perspective that departed from economists’ 
theories of rational choice. He highlighted the limits of human rationality in explaining 
how managers make decisions. Simon suggested that individuals have bounded attention 
and, consequently, are characterized by bounded rationality. For Simon, organizations 
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influence individual decision processes by allocating and distributing the stimuli that 
channel the attention of managers in terms of what selected aspects of the situation are to 
be attended, and what aspects are to be ignored. Firm behavior is both a cognitive and a 
structural process. Decision-making in organizations is viewed as the result of both the 
limited attentional capacity of individuals and the structural influences of organizations 
on an individual’s attention (Ocasio, 1997). 
 The primary intention of the attentional perspective is to explain firm behavior 
by suggesting how firms distribute and regulate the focus of their decision-makers. 
Building on Simon’s ideas, Ocasio (1997) suggested that decision makers attend to 
issues and answers based on:  (1) the focus of their attention, (2) the situation in which 
their attention is focused, and (3) the rules and procedures of communication that 
structure decision-makers attention.  A focus on the structuring of organizational 
attention to explain firm behavior is of special interest and importance for our 
understanding of strategic choice (Child, 1972). The firm in Ocasio’s view is an open 
social system. Through attentional processing and decision-making, the inputs from the 
environment are transformed by the organization into a set of outputs – the 
organization’s actions. 
 The primary objective in this chapter, through the use of Ocasio’s (1997) 
attentional framework, is to develop a general process view of how boards behave in 
different contexts, situational and environmental.  An all inclusive theoretical and 
empirical study of boards’ attention structures and resulting actions are far more than can 
be completed in this dissertation. The focus here is on boards’ attention structures as 
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they relate to the pursuit of perceived opportunities – strategic and entrepreneurial. A 
model is developed to provide a set of implications of how attentional processing helps 
explain when, why, and how organizations adapt to changes in their environment (Astley 
& Vandeven, 1983; Ocasio, 1997).  The view is segmented into three stages of 
attentional process – focus of attention, situated attention, and structural distribution of 
attention. These three stages, and their more specific components, are applied to better 
understand how the board of directors’ attention is allocated. 
 Focus of Attention.  As noted, attention is a limited resource. The principle of 
focus of attention indicates that decision-makers will be selective in the issues and 
answers they attend to at any one time and that what decision-makers do depends on the 
issues and answers they focus their attention on (Ocasio, 1997). This selective focus of 
attention facilitates perception and consideration towards the object or idea being 
considered, and logically away from others. Consequently, the selective focus of 
attention will influence what actions (or inactions) are selected. Naturally, boards of 
directors can be presumed to follow the principle of focus of attention as their actions 
likely derive from the issues and answers that have received the most board attention. 
 Situated Attention. Attention is limited and capricious. Attention can often be 
easily prompted or diverted by relatively small, peripheral issues. This connotes 
weakness of attention. However, it is ‘tangential attention’, based on seemingly semi- or 
irrelevant knowledge, which may lead to opportunity identification.  The principle of 
situated attention suggests that what decision-makers focus on, and what they do, 
depends on the particular context in which they are located. It implies that individual 
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decision-makers will vary their focus of attention depending on the situation. Also, the 
consistency (or variance) in attention and behavior is dependent more on consistency (or 
variance) in the characteristics of the situation rather than characteristics of the 
individuals (Ocasio, 1997).  
 Situated attention explores: (1) the intersections where individuals make 
decisions in specific contexts, and (2) how the organization and its environment shape 
the situations in which individuals find themselves. Decision-makers react to situations 
as shaped by the organization and its environment. In the case of organizational 
decision-making and action, the principle of situated attention highlights the effects of 
the organizational and environmental contexts in shaping individuals’ focus of attention 
and action (Ocasio, 1997).  
 The board’s situated attention is affected by internal firm structures and 
procedures (formal and informal), as well as external firm environmental structures and 
experiences. For the board as a whole, factors such as where the board meetings are 
held, how long the meeting are, what industry the firm competes in, and how the firm is 
situated in the general environment are all potential determinants of board attention 
allocation. At the individual director level, each outside director comes to the board with 
a unique perspective that is shaped by their experiences and knowledge. Each director 
must determine how they will interrelate with the structure and interactions of the 
current board. Therefore, the perspective from which the board of directors, as strategic 
decision-makers (or evaluators), frame their scarce attention is crucial to the likelihood 
of a firm implementing entrepreneurial strategies and actions. The actions of the board 
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and all other decision-makers are triggered by the issues and answers with which they 
are familiar.  
 Structural Distribution of Attention. Simon (1947) contends that the firm’s 
economic and social structures create, channel, and distribute the attention of decision-
makers into discrete processes. Organizational actions and decisions result from the 
complex interactions among these discrete attentional processes. He further describes 
organizational behavior as a complex network of attentional processes. 
 The principle of structural distribution of attention proposes that the particular 
context decision-makers find themselves in, and how they attend to it, depends on how 
the organization’s rules, resources, and social relationships regulate and control the 
allocation of issues, answers, and decision-makers within specific firm activities, 
communications, and procedures (Ocasio, 1997). Accordingly, each level of decision-
making in the firm involves certain procedures and communication processes that focus 
attention on specific issues and answers. This perspective provides an alternative 
explanation for firm behavior -- both to theories of rational choice, such as game theory 
and agency theory, and to theories that emphasize environmental determinism, such as 
population ecology (Ocasio, 1997). 
 Boards of directors and others in the firm are subject to this principle. For 
instance, the board conducts its business subject to a specific context constructed of a 
firm environment, an industry environment, and a general environment. The 
communication channels and procedures that exist among the inside and outside 
directors adds complexity to the boardroom context and may have social and political 
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effects on board dynamics. Specifically, the chairperson’s board agenda formally 
allocates board meeting time and thus, the issues and answers discussed.  Each of these 
effects may also have ramifications for the individual directors, both within the board 
and in outside relationships.  All of these contextual items iteratively affect the attention 
structures of the board as a whole and the directors individually.  Also, the board utilizes 
procedures and communication channels to disseminate and focus attention throughout 
the organization. However, a large part of the board’s purpose is to focus the attention of 
top management. Through this process, the top management may design the organization 
to properly attend to matters deemed most important by the board. 
Shaping Board Attention 
 Utilizing the three principles of an attention-based model of the firm, as 
presented by Ocasio (1997) and briefly described above, this broad model of 
organizational attention and behavior is enriched by exploring the board of directors, 
which may be crucial as a strategic juncture between the firm and its environment. As 
noted previously, a determination of the influence and effect boards have on the strategic 
attention of the firm is an incredibly broad task. Therefore, this study focuses only on the 
board’s influence and effect on strategic entrepreneurship. As noted in Chapter III, the 
concept of strategic entrepreneurship refers, in part, to a firm’s perpetual attempt to 
pursue opportunities that may become future firm competencies. These opportunities 
must be recognized and championed by someone with the power to gain the attention of 
the firm’s decision makers. Based on this stream of logic, certain board members are in a 
strategic position to uniquely view the firm from a non- or less-socialized, outsider’s 
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perspective (relative to long term management or insider directors). This view may more 
accurately pinpoint where the firm is relative to others in its industrial environment and 
the general environment. It may also allow the board to recognize potential opportunities 
that are hard to see from exclusively inside-out or outside-in the firm. Figure 1 
graphically summarizes the hypothesized relationships between the board of directors’ 
attention and the firm’s actions toward strategic entrepreneurship. 
Environment of Decision  
 The environment of decision (Barnard, 1938) encompasses the multiple material, 
social, and cultural factors, both internal and external to the firm, that impinge upon any 
decision activity (Ocasio, 1997). In an attention based model, the firm’s environment 
provides the raw stimuli for the structuring of organizational practices and decision-
making (Barnard, 1938; Ocasio, 1997). However, an organizational environment is too 
complex for any boundedly rational person, or even all boundedly rational persons, to 
make sense of completely and accurately.  Nevertheless, decision-makers must make 
efforts to control the situational ambiguity of their environment, at least as well as their 
competitors.  
 Weick (1995) offers insight into a form of sensemaking that is particularly 
applicable to boards of directors.  He suggest that interactive intersubjectivity, which 
means controlled information processing, makes severe demands on participants 
attention. This type of subjectivity is often perceived to be detrimental in hierarchical  
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Munificence
Complexity
Note: This model is adapted from Ocasio’s (1997) conceptualization of the Attention-Based View 
Firm-Level
Strategic 
Entrepreneurial 
Action
Attention Structure
Breadth of Knowledge:
• Aggregate Board Breadth (Hypothesis 5)
Director Knowledge:
• Insider – Corporate Venturing Related
(Hypothesis 4)
• Intra-Industry (Hypotheses 5a)
• Inter-Industry (Hypothesis 5b)
• General Science (Hypothesis 5c)
Intra-industry Firm Size
(Hypotheses 3a & 3b)
Procedural & 
Communication
Channels
Dimensions:
• Spatial       (Hypothesis 8a)
• Temporal   (Hypothesis 8b)
• Procedural (Hypothesis 8c)
Figure 2   A Top-down Process of Strategic Entrepreneurial Attention and Resource Allocation
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organizations. In the board room where the power structure is much flatter, directors can 
and should actively challenge each other’s subjective sensemaking. This process creates 
situations where learning, and thus more accurate sensemaking, can take place. Through 
this enactment of issues and answers, the boardroom decision-makers selectively restrict 
their attention to a limited set of stimuli. Intuitively, the sensemaking of the board may 
only be as good as the directors’ individual ideas, their knowledge of their environments 
and the firm’s place in its environment.     
 The study of the environment-organization interface has been an important topic 
in the organizational theory and strategic management literatures (Keats & Hitt, 1988). 
Researchers have investigated the relationships between environmental characteristics 
and organizational characteristics, such as: (1) strategies (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fredrickson 
& Mitchell, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998), (2) structures 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), and (3) 
performance (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Li & Simerly, 1998). As the resource 
environment becomes richer or leaner, more or less stable, more homogeneous or 
heterogeneous, or more concentrated or dispersed, the options available to organizations 
change accordingly (Galaskiewicz, 1985).  
 The premise behind these streams of research is that external environments 
impact firm performance, and organizations must take into account environmental 
characteristics when formulating strategies and structures (Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). An organization’s environment creates 
uncertainty, defined as “the degree to which future states cannot be anticipated or 
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accurately predicted” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Uncertainty makes it more difficult for 
organizational leaders to formulate and implement strategies and structures. 
 One area of board research that has received relatively little attention is the 
nature of the relationship between board attributes and contextual factors (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). Contextual factors include both internal and external forces that influence 
the direction and magnitude of organization activities. External forces have undergone 
considerable examination in organization theory (Barnard, 1938; Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). This research stream demonstrates the importance of environmental factors to the 
survival and performance of organizations, especially with respect to the development 
and maintenance of resources flows. Through their impact on resource flows, 
environmental factors play a vital role in organizational outcomes. The linking of the 
organization with those environmental factors is one of the major functions of the board 
of directors.  It is possible that a firm’s environment and the uncertainty associated with 
it play a significant role in its board of director’s attention. 
 Negotiating uncertainty has always been a major issue for organizations (Cyert & 
March, 1963). Thompson (1967) considers dealing with uncertainty as the essence of the 
administrative process. Independently, however, uncertainty is not necessarily 
problematic. In fact, many opportunities derive from uncertainty. Of course, uncertainty 
is heterogeneous among industries. Uncertainty becomes problematic when the 
uncertainty involves important interactions and transactions with elements of the 
environment that are vital for the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When 
situations of exchange and competition are uncertain and problematic, organizations 
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attempt to establish linkages with elements in their environment and use these linkages 
to access resources, stabilize outcomes, and avert environmental control (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
 In brief, the task environment refers to those external elements with which the 
focal organization has direct interaction and that: (1) influence the achievement of 
organizational goals, (2) use the same resources, (3) compete directly with the 
organization or produce close substitutes, or (4) are customers or potential customers 
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Starbuck, 1976). The task environment contrasts with the general 
environment, which consists of all other external elements that impact the firm only 
indirectly. Consequently, the firm is primarily concerned with elements of its task 
environment, though firms are not unconcerned with the elements of the general 
environment. 
 Starbuck (1976) presented an exhaustive review of the organizational task 
environment literature. He concluded that prior research suggested nearly as many 
distinct dimensions of the task environment as the number of studies done on it. In an 
attempt to simplify and sort out the environmental literature, Aldrich (1979) categorized 
the task environment into six dimensions. In a successive study, Dess and Beard (1984) 
used factor analysis to collapse Aldrich’s six dimensions into three. In this factor 
analysis, the fourth and fifth factors were significant, but together explained less 
variance than the third factor alone. Consequently, Dess and Beard retained only three 
factors for their analyses. These three resulting dimensions are similar to dimensions 
proposed in prior literature (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Jurkovic, 
 
 
 
     
 
62
1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). They are nearly indistinguishable from the most crucial 
environmental conditions identified by Child (1972): illiberality, variability, and 
complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984). These three dimensions -- dynamism, munificence, 
and complexity -- have subsequently dominated empirical studies (e.g., Keats & Hitt, 
1988). 
 Authors have employed both perceptual (e.g., Boyd, Dess, & Racheed, 1993; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and objective (e.g., Dess & Beard, 1984; Milliken, 1987) 
measures to quantify a firm’s task environment. Bluedorn’s (1993) extensive review of 
the environmental literature concludes that objective measures of dynamism, 
complexity, and munificence still constitute the principal way to describe and 
conceptualize the fundamental properties of organizational environments. He suggests 
that these dimensions affect an omnibus perception of the environment: uncertainty. The 
relationships between dynamism, complexity, and munificence are summarized and 
linked to boards of directors in the following sections. 
 Dynamism. Dynamism refers to the instability of a firm’s environment, 
represents change that is difficult to predict, and creates uncertainty for a firm’s 
management (Dess & Beard, 1984; Jurkovic, 1974; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974). 
Miles, Snow, and Pfeffer (1974) note that it is imperative to distinguish between the rate 
of environmental change and the unpredictability of environmental change. Rapid 
change that is predictable by management does not represent uncertainty (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). For example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1973) suggest that seasonal 
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fluctuations represent rapid change, but these changes are predictable by management 
and do not result in heightened uncertainty. 
 Dynamism closely follows Aldrich’s (1979) idea of environmental turbulence -- 
externally induced changes that are obscure to administrators and difficult to plan for. 
Environments constantly undergo incremental change. Dynamism represents radical and 
unpredictable change, such as revolutionary periods. They interrupt periods of 
equilibrium, as suggested in Gersick’s (1991) punctuated equilibrium paradigm. These 
changes might also include the discontinuous shifts that break periods of incremental 
change, as discussed by Keck and Tushman (1993) in their examination of 
environmental shifts. 
 Highly turbulent environments represent the high end of the dynamism 
continuum (Bluedorn, 1993). Executives in these environments must have the ability to 
adapt quickly to cope with these constant and ambiguous changes (Galbraith, 1973). 
Increasing levels of dynamism result in heightened environmental uncertainty for 
organizational leaders (Duncan, 1972; Li & Simerly, 1998). Dynamic task environments 
are characterized by frequent, nonperiodic change that is not easily foreseen by 
management. Consequently, managers of firms with dynamic task environments often 
establish environmental linkages to provide them with information that will allow better 
anticipation of both the nature and rate of future change.  According to Duncan (1972), 
these types of environmental changes may dramatically impact firm structures and 
operations. Keck and Tushman (1993), for example, suggest that environmental jolts 
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may be related to changes in executive team structure and processes. These 
environmental jolts are posited to be related to board structure and processes. 
 A number of empirical studies have examined the association between dynamism 
and firm performance, strategies, and structures. Keats and Hitt (1988) investigated 110 
large manufacturing firms. Dynamism, which they referred to as instability, was found to 
be negatively associated with diversification and operating performance, but positively 
with market performance. Dollinger and Golden (1992), using a sample of smaller firms, 
found a negative relationship between dynamism and operating margins. They found no 
association between dynamism and interorganizational relationships. McArthur and 
Nystrom (1991) found a negative relationship between dynamism and return on 
investment. They also found that dynamism moderated the relationship between firm 
strategy and performance. Bergh and Lawless (1998) provide some evidence to suggest 
that dynamism moderates the relationship between diversification strategy and portfolio 
restructuring. Simerly and Li (2000) reported that dynamism moderated the relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance. 
  Empirical studies have also explored the relationship between dynamism and the 
characteristics of boards of directors. Li and Simerly (1998) found that dynamism 
moderated the relationship between inside director equity ownership and firm 
performance. Their results suggest that the relationship between inside director equity 
ownership and firm performance is stronger for firms in industries with high levels of 
dynamism. Boyd (1995), however, reported no evidence to support his hypothesis that 
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dynamism moderates the relationship between board leadership structure and firm 
performance. 
 In summary, theory suggests that increasing levels of environmental dynamism 
result in heightened uncertainty for organizational leaders (e.g., Duncan, 1972). 
However, the empirical evidence suggests inconsistent relationships between this 
uncertainty and firm performance, organizational structures, and firm leadership 
characteristics. Most notable, though, are the inconsistent findings regarding the 
relationship between environmental dynamism and firm performance. A number of 
studies suggest a negative relationship between dynamism and firm performance (e.g., 
Dollinger and Golden, 1992; Keats and Hitt, 1988). More limited evidence suggests a 
positive relationship between dynamism and market performance (e.g., Keats and Hitt, 
1988). 
 Firms interfacing with dynamic environments will typically attempt to reduce the 
effects of dynamism and, thereby, reduce the uncertainty that surrounds the strategic 
decisions organizational leaders must make. One function of boards is to enhance the 
ability to cope with uncertainty and unpredictability by bringing improved, broader, or 
more general, environmental information to the firm’s decision makers’ attention. The 
improvement comes in the form of higher quality of information and better interpretation 
of it. The information processing competency that outside directors bring improves top 
management’s potential capacity for predicting environmental changes. Consequently, 
based on the value of general environmental information, firms in more dynamic 
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industries will need to have a higher proportion of board members representing different 
aspects of the firm’s task environment. 
 Munificence. Environmental munificence refers to the scarceness or abundance 
of critical resources needed by the firm or firms operating within a particular 
environment Castrogiovanni (1991). Munificence indicates the environment’s ability to 
influence the survival and growth of firms sharing that environment (Dess & Beard, 
1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Starbuck, 1976). Munificence 
provides firms with high resource availability, easy access to necessary resources, and 
affords the opportunity to generate slack. Slack is integral to organizational survival 
because it provides a buffer against lean times and increases the firm’s opportunities for 
innovation. A firm with organizational slack tends to place less emphasis on conserving 
its resources and experiences less constraint on strategic choices (Chakravarthy, 1984). 
Rajagolpalan, Rasheed, and Datta (1993) state that uncertain environments that are also 
munificent (e.g., high growth industries in initial stages of industry evolution) are very 
different from uncertain environments which are far less munificent (e.g., mature 
industries with declining demand or increasing competition).  
 In highly munificent environments, survival is relatively easy and allows firms to 
pursue goals other than survival (Castrogiovanni, 1991). In fact, highly munificent 
environments provide for significant organizational growth. This growth allows 
organizations to buffer themselves from external threats and helps them to amass slack 
resources, which can be employed in more scarce periods (Cyert & March, 1963). Slack 
provides organizations with greater flexibility and more growth opportunities (Aldrich, 
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1979). However, high levels of free cash flow may also result in a multitude of agency 
problems (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Jensen, 1986). 
 In environments with low levels of munificence, resources are scarce. This 
adversely affects both firm profitability and organizational slack (Castrogiovanni, 1991). 
Consequently, firm survival becomes the primary goal. According to Goll and Rasheed 
(1997), firms in nonmunificent environments must devote greater effort to understand 
external threats. In addition, managerial decisions become magnified when resources are 
scarce. The losses associated with faulty decisions may be highly damaging to 
organizations continued viability. Due to these disadvantages, the potential for new 
competitors diminishes as prospective entrants observe the low resource levels and 
decide to instead search for new opportunities in more resource abundant environments. 
Hence, low munificence induces firms to seek ways to enhance resource accessibility 
and availability. 
 Prior literature has investigated the relationship between munificence and each of 
the following: organizational strategies, structures, and performance. Goll and Rasheed 
(1997), for example, found among a sample of large manufacturing firms that 
munificence moderated the relationship between rational decision-making and firm 
performance, as measured by both return on assets and return on sales. Their results 
suggest that rational decision-making is most strongly associated with performance in 
highly munificent environments. McArthur and Nystrom (1991) also found evidence to 
document the moderating impact of munificence on the relationship between strategy 
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and performance. Dollinger and Golden (1992) found a positive relationship between 
munificence on both sales growth and interorganizational relationships. 
 Another stream of research, more directly relevant to this study, assesses the 
impact of munificence on the characteristics of boards of directors. Staw and 
Swajkowski (1975), for example, found that firms in environments with low 
munificence were more likely to commit illegal acts; thus, suggesting that boards need to 
monitor more closely. McLean Parks and Conlon (1995) investigated the impact of 
munificence on monitoring and found that agency theory predictions prevailed only in 
munificent environments. Boyd (1995) found that CEO duality was positively related to 
performance in munificent environments. Wiersema and Bantel (1993) presented results 
that suggest a positive relationship between munificence and strategic change, as well as 
between munificence and top management turnover. In other words, although 
organizational leaders operated in environments with high levels of slack to create a 
comfortable context, they still felt the need to alter the strategies of their firms.  
 One of the roles of the board is to facilitate the firm’s access to resources. 
According to the resource dependence perspective, firms in less munificent 
environments depend more heavily on the interorganizational links that directors bring to 
the board.  Therefore, firms in industries with low munificence will, presumably, have a 
high proportion of board members from within the task environment. Firms in 
munificent environments are likely to experience greater slack and more opportunities 
for innovation and internal integration. For these firms, board composition should reflect 
the firms’ lower concern with sources of supply and distribution of output (as resources 
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are abundant, by definition). Thus, munificence may lead to less focus on external 
resource acquisition on the part of the board.    
 In conclusion, the theoretical literature suggests that organizational leaders are 
likely to prefer operating in munificent environments. However, empirical studies fail to 
report a consistent relationship between environmental munificence and firm 
performance (e.g., Dollinger & Golden, 1992; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Many empirical 
investigations report that munificence moderates the relationships between firm 
strategies and decision-making and firm performance. Empirical evidence suggests that 
munificence is associated with organizational leaders’ actions and characteristics. Taken 
together, environmental munificence is associated with firm strategies, structures, 
performance, and organizational leader characteristics. The direction of these 
relationships, however, is inconsistent.  
Complexity. Complexity refers to the heterogeneity associated with an 
environment (Child, 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972; Thompson, 1967). Firms 
in increasingly complex environments transact with a wider array of inputs and outputs 
and encounter a larger number of highly differentiated environmental actors. This makes 
resource acquisition and disposal more difficult. As a firm’s environment becomes more 
complex, executives must deal with more stakeholders whose demands may conflict 
(Dess & Beard, 1984). Accordingly, executives operating in complex environments 
confront more uncertainty than managers operating in simple environments (Dess & 
Beard, 1984).  The information processing demands requisite in more complex 
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environments represent an inherently more difficult management task (Dollinger & 
Golden, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). 
 According to Sharfman and Dean (1991), complexity can result from industry 
concentration (e.g., Starbuck, 1976), product diversity (Thompson, 1967), or technical 
intricacy (Mintzberg, 1979). The complexity that has been described and operationalized 
as the level of industry competition (Boyd, 1990) is considered part of this larger 
conceptualization of complexity. Most recent investigations of complexity focus on 
industry concentration (e.g. Keats & Hitt, 1988). Industries with low monopoly power 
and few competitors represent less complex environments. Fragmented industries with 
many competitors indicate more complex environments (Dollinger & Golden, 1992).
 Some empirical work has investigated the impact of complexity on firm 
strategies, structures, and performance. Keats and Hitt (1988) found some evidence that 
environments with low levels of complexity supported growth. McArthur and Nystom 
(1991) reported that complexity significantly moderated the relationship between firm 
strategy and performance. Dollinger and Golden (1992) found a positive relationship 
between complexity and relative competitor performance. They also found that more 
complex industries (defined as more fragmented industries with more competitors) were 
associated with fewer cooperative strategies. In contrast to the findings of Dollinger and 
Golden (1992), Wiersema and Bantel (1993) reported a negative relationship between 
complexity and firm performance. These conflicting findings may have resulted from the 
differences in data sources for firm performance. Dollinger and Golden relied on 
perceptual measures obtained from managers. Wiersema and Bantel relied on more 
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objective measures from publicly reported sources. Additionally, these conflicting 
findings may have resulted from differences in sample contexts; Dollinger and Golden 
studied smaller entrepreneurial firms, both data sources and sample compositions could 
have accounted for the inconsistent results. 
 There also exists a stream of empirical research that advocates the impact of 
complexity on characteristics of boards of directors. Boyd (1995) found evidence of a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and firm performance for firms operating in 
highly complex environments. Boyd (1990) found a negative relationship between 
uncertainty and board size, a positive relationship between uncertainty and director 
interlocks, and a moderating effect of performance on both relationships. Despite the 
above studies, there has been relatively little empirical research specifically examining 
the dimensions of the task environment with the attributes of top management teams or 
boards of directors. 
 In comparison to both environmental dynamism and environmental munificence, 
the empirical evidence investigating environmental complexity is less substantial. The 
theoretical literature proposes a negative relationship between environmental complexity 
and firm performance. However, the empirical evidence reports an inconsistent 
relationship between these two variables. In addition, there is limited empirical evidence 
to suggest significant relationships between complexity and the characteristics of boards 
of directors.  
 Hypotheses: Environmental Context. Hypotheses are proposed to explore the 
relationship between each of these constructs of a firm’s environmental context and 
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board-level entrepreneurial attention or firm-level entrepreneurial action. In these 
hypotheses, the construct of strategic entrepreneurial attention represents the amount of 
attention the board of directors allocates toward a firm’s opportunity- and advantage-
seeking strategies. Entrepreneurial attention is explored as attention focused on 
entrepreneurial indicators. These indicators that boards may discuss, which are based on 
previous theoretical and empirical works, include: (1) pursuing and evaluating 
opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), (2) interpreting uncertainty as 
opportunities (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000), (3) coordinating with social/external 
networks , (4) proactiveness (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001), (5) innovativeness (Hitt et al., 
2001), (6) risk-taking (Norton & Moore, 2002),  (7) growth strategy (Peng & Heath, 
1996), (8) acting regardless of resources currently controlled (Hitt et al., 2001), (9) long-
term orientation (Hitt et al., 2001), and (10) wealth creation (Hitt et al., 2001). Strategic 
entrepreneurial actions are firm-level actions that can be categorized as either 
competency creating actions or existing firm competency leveraging actions. These 
actions are the fundamental behaviors of firms including (1) moving into new markets, 
(2) seizing new customers, (3) introducing new resources, and/or 4.) combining markets, 
customers, and resources in new ways (Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002).  
 Viewing board-level attention allocation and firm-level actions through an 
attentional-based model provokes questions about both the environmental context in 
which the firm competes (Figure 1: environment of decision) and the situational context 
(Figure 1: attention structures, issues and answers and procedural and communication 
channels) in which the board makes decisions. From this perspective’s lens, it is not 
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enough to analyze a board decision or a firm action independent of its respective context. 
Rather, to make more complete sense of how such decisions and actions are derived, we 
must consider the environment and/or situation in which they were formulated and 
implemented.  Decisions and actions do not happen in sociological, economic, physical, 
etc… vacuums. All happen in contexts which are nested in larger contexts.  
 The full model, depicted in Figure 1, suggests that board-level and firm-level 
attention structures (themselves posited to be affected by the firm’s environmental 
context) will affect board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention as mediators. 
Subsequent to this effect, board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention will affect firm-
level strategic entrepreneurial actions.  But before examining the possible indirect effects 
of the environmental context on board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention and firm-
level strategic entrepreneurial actions, the direct effects of the environmental context 
need to be considered. Therefore, with respect to each firm’s (competitive) 
environmental context, the following hypotheses explore the associated direct impact 
that a firm’s environmental context can have on board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention and firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions.  
Hypothesis 1:   A firm’s environmental context 
(environment of decision) is related to the board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention and firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  The level of environmental dynamism will 
be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  The level of environmental dynamism will 
be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. 
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Hypothesis 1c:  The level of environmental munificence 
will be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
 
Hypothesis 1d:  The level of environmental munificence 
will be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. 
 
Hypothesis 1e:  The level of environmental complexity will 
be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
 
Hypothesis 1f:  The level of environmental complexity will 
be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. 
 
Attention Structures  
 Attention structures are the social, economic, and cultural configurations that 
govern the allocation of time, effort, and attentional focus of board members and 
executives in their decision-making activities (March & Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1997). 
Attention structures regulate: (1) the valuation and legitimization of issues and answers, 
(2) the creation and distribution of procedural and communication channels, (3) and the 
interests and identities that guide decision-makers’ actions and interpretations. Ocasio 
(1997) suggests four interacting factors as internal and external environment attention 
regulators:  rules of the game, players, structural positions, and resources. Ocasio’s 
regulators of organizational attention structures can be applied to a firm’s board of 
directors through this study’s adaptation of the attention-based model. The rationale for 
applying the attention structure regulators is as follows:   
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 First, the board’s rules, resources, and social relations structure attention in board 
meetings and director interactions by generating a set of values that order the 
legitimacy, importance, and relevance of issues and answers.  
 Second, these attention structures channel and distribute the decision-making 
activity within the board interactions into a concrete set of procedures and 
communications.  
 Third, attention structures provide the decision-makers with a defined set of 
interests and identities.  
 The board of director’s environment-firm boundary position facilitates attention 
structures that are unique to any other environmental intersection with the firm. Each of 
the four mechanisms that comprise the structural distribution of board attention are 
considered in more detail below. The four categories of attention structures are as 
follows: 
 Rules of the Game. Rules of the game are the formal and informal principles of 
action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision-makers in 
accomplishing the firm’s tasks and in obtaining social status, credits, and rewards in the 
process (Ocasio, 1997). Boards, not being entirely inside the organization or entirely 
outside the organization, should continually interpret and reinterpret what constitutes 
appropriate behavior in communications between directors. The board’s (typically 
implicit) principles for action, interaction, and interpretation are collective human 
constructions that reflect the board’s history and the history of the environment. This 
pattern greatly complicates our understanding and explanations of board behavior, as 
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rules must be historically  and culturally situated in the social context in which they were 
derived and developed (Ocasio, 1997).  
 Boards must operate as what Barnard (1938) refers to as a cooperative system, 
whose common purpose is collective action. However, within this cooperative system of 
directors, it is naïve to neglect the potential presence of shifting political coalitions 
(Cyert & March, 1963). As is often the case between organizations, it is this very 
competition-cooperation dynamic between directors that may result in the epiphany of 
an opportunity that was previously unseen by the board. This opportunity can then be 
evaluated, which can be difficult if political factions within the board are still at odds. If 
deemed worthy of action, entrepreneurial strategies may be developed and, ultimately, 
become entrepreneurial actions by the firm. Long term historical norms, values, and 
principles of interaction of the board are unquestionably important. However, they also 
are incredibly difficult to fully understand. To begin to gain some understanding, future 
studies should explore the implications of historical interactions of the board and how 
these interactions impact later issues and answers. Intuition suggests that a board 
(composed of two factions -- one of insiders and another of outsiders) that has recently 
encountered serious governance issues may have difficulty shifting the boards attention 
toward strategic entrepreneurship as significant issue.  
 Players. Players are the individuals and groups of individuals in the 
organizational game who are important components of the firm’s attention regulation 
(Ocasio, 1997). Players affect the firm’s attention regulation through the specific skills, 
beliefs, and values they bring to the firm (March & Olsen, 1976). Top managers are key 
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players in organizations. Of course, there are additional players -- middle or divisional 
management, active board members, union representatives, institutional investors, 
consultants, etc… Each of these individuals or groups may affect the attention of 
decision-makers. Therefore, they can affect decisions.  
 Players may also draw decision-makers’ attention to new issues or suggest new 
answers that are appropriate for the firm. The board of directors may act as players for 
this type of action. Boards are mandated as representatives of the shareholders to oversee 
the management of their firms. Based on this power by proxy, they command the 
attention of management. So with the attention of management, each director’s 
perspective becomes a potential source of value. Perspectives of directors can affect the 
attention of the board which can then affect the attention of the management and 
ultimately result in firm actions. The following section explores the impact that 
individual directors have on the board’s attention based on prior knowledge and 
experience.  
 Breadth of Knowledge. Unfortunately, most research on entrepreneurship 
investigates the entrepreneurial process after opportunities have been discovered (Fiet, 
1996). However, Shane (2000) utilizes Austrian economics to portray the recognition of 
opportunities as distinctive cognitive feats whose accomplishment is conditioned by an 
entrepreneur’s prior experience and education.  More often, researchers have drawn on 
either neoclassical economic or psychological theories that assume people will discover 
the same opportunities in a given situation, or discover opportunities that are 
uncorrelated with the attributes of the discoverers. Neoclassical economics makes the 
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assumption of public knowledge about opportunities, which suggests that all 
opportunities must be equally obvious to everyone. Austrian economics challenges the 
validity of these assumptions, arguing that different people will discover different 
opportunities in a given technological change because they posses different prior 
knowledge (Venkataraman, 1997).  Drawing from Hayek (1945), Shane (2000) suggests 
that opportunity discovery is a function of the distribution of information in society. 
Further, Shane’s (2000) paper shows, through in-depth case studies, that entrepreneurs 
discover opportunities related to information that they already posses. Kirzner (1973) 
notes that once the assumption of complete information is relaxed, the discovery of 
opportunity cannot be understood through “mechanical computation” because any given 
individual cannot identify all possible opportunities.  
 Venkataraman (1997) asks, “why do people discover some entrepreneurial 
opportunities and not others?” One answer is that people recognize those opportunities 
related to information that they already possess. People have different stocks of 
information because information is generated through people’s idiosyncratic life 
experiences. Also, because information is often distributed through a stochastic process, 
some people possess information that others do not have through blind luck (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). As a result and at any given time, only some people will know about 
particular customer problems, market characteristics, or the ways to create particular 
products or services (Shane, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). 
 Kirzner (1997) concludes that existing explanations for entrepreneurship are 
incomplete because they do not explain adequately the process of opportunity discovery, 
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a crucial component of the entrepreneurship process. Cognitive limits and the 
specialization of knowledge preclude entrepreneurs from identifying the complete set of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Shane’s (2000) results support Kirzner’s (1997) idea that 
the process of discovery can be driven by recognition of knowledge already possessed 
rather than by search for knowledge needed. Consequently, individuals who have 
developed particular knowledge through education and work experience will be more 
likely than other people to discover particular entrepreneurial opportunities in response 
to a given technological change (Venkataraman, 1997). 
 Shane (2000) also found evidence that individual differences influence the 
discovery of opportunities in a way other than that generally described in the literature. 
Shane’s study suggests that entrepreneurs discover opportunities, not because they have 
special attributes that make them better able to recognize opportunities (Schumpeter, 
1934), but because idiosyncratic prior knowledge makes some people better able to 
discover certain opportunities than others. These findings reiterate the importance of 
individual differences to the entrepreneurship process, and demonstrate that 
entrepreneurship can not be explained solely by reference to factors external to 
individuals.  
 Appling Kirzner’s, Shane’s, and Venkataraman’s ideas regarding 
entrepreneurship to strategic entrepreneurship in established enterprises, the relationship 
is explored between board of director ‘breadth of knowledge’, or composition of 
knowledge and prior information, and the allocation of roles that directors fulfill. Of 
particular interest is the role that boards take, in different situational contexts, toward 
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identifying strategic entrepreneurial opportunities and exploiting strategic 
entrepreneurial opportunities through firm actions.     
 Evidence suggests that at least some of the actions that lead first to creativity and 
subsequently to innovation result from a process called bisociation (Koestler, 1964). 
Bisociation occurs when a person combines two or more previously unrelated matrices 
of skills or information (Koestler, 1964; Smith & Di Gregorio, 2002). Bisociation takes 
place when individuals combine information to identify an opportunity or to help shape 
competitive advantages (Ireland et al., 2003). In general, the greater the breadth of 
individuals’ knowledge, the more likely they will be able to use a bisociation decision 
process. 
 As noted throughout this dissertation, boards of directors were chosen due to the 
directors’ unique boundary position between the firm and its environment. Boards 
typically are constructed, in various compositions, of both strategically chosen outsiders 
and key insiders.  Prior research has explored a plethora of demographic variables 
related to directors. This study explores the composition of knowledge and information 
in the board room and how it is associated with a firm’s entrepreneurial strategy and, 
ultimately, entrepreneurial actions in different contexts.  To explore the values of 
different kinds of director knowledge and information, a typology of relative knowledge 
must be constructed.  The categories below are adopted from Klevorick, Levin, Nelson 
and Winter (1995). These authors state that this typology was designed to: (1) lend 
greater precision to the knowledge concept, (2) develop various operational measures of 
an industry’s technological opportunity, (3) and examine inter-industry differences in 
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technological opportunities. They apply this typology to industries. This study applies it 
to directors as representatives from different industries. The categories are as follows: 
 General Scientific Knowledge – Klevorick et al. (1995) state that the most 
powerful and, over the long run, almost certainly the most important source of 
new technological opportunities has been the advance of scientific knowledge. 
Most significant breakthroughs can be traced directly to advances in basic 
general scientific understanding that occurred just prior to the breakthrough 
(Klevorick et al., 1995).  The connections between scientific advance and 
technological advance are complex and subtle. The lags are long and the 
feedbacks intricate. Klevorick et al. (1995) reiterate prior findings that demand-
based (or problem-based) entrepreneurial innovations are less risky than supply-
based entrepreneurial innovations. However, this less risky type of innovation is 
consistent with less return. Few supply-based entrepreneurial innovations are 
highly successful by market standards. When one is successful, it is more likely 
to be a radical innovation with substantial returns. Myopic perspectives naturally 
occur from being embedded in certain situations. Who has the greatest 
likelihood of identifying a more radical entrepreneurial opportunity in such a 
situation? Those individuals who have not been socialized within a certain firm 
or its industry may come up with insightful, frame-breaking suggestions in a 
board setting. Consider the vast general knowledge that most outside directors 
have acquired by the time they are placed on a board. These directors can make 
suggestions that may seem outlandish to an embedded insider. Upon an iterative 
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discussion among a variety of perspectives, a suggestion may come to be seen as 
an opportunity worth researching further.   
  Inter-Industry Knowledge – Knowledge in one industry can be cultivated from 
knowledge in another, sometimes a seemingly unrelated, industry. The creation 
of new general purpose components (e.g., power sources or electronic 
components) quite often opens new technological opportunities in a variety of 
industries (Klevorick et al., 1995). Also, product markets and uses are not 
always in the vision of industry insiders (e.g., typewriter industry only realized 
the threat of the computer after it was too late). A firm is not likely to fill a board 
seat with a director from a totally unrelated industry. However, directors who 
may have initially been intended to serve in a monitoring or resource access role 
on the board may end up providing the most value to the firm via a unique 
perspective.  
 Advances in production process technology and equipment are often the 
result of work done by upstream suppliers. These advances can expand a 
downstream industry’s perspective of potential opportunities. Improvements in 
the instruments, equipment, or know-how that firms in an industry use can also 
expand the set of perceived entrepreneurial opportunities for them. Consumers, 
or other downstream end-users, may also be able to identify (via suggestions and 
requests) opportunities for a firm or an entire industry. 
 Intra-Industry Knowledge – More specific knowledge, relative to general 
scientific knowledge and inter-industry knowledge, may be available within a 
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given industry. In general, it is undesirable to have direct competitors from 
within an industry on a firm’s board of directors. The involvement of having 
some directors who come from other organizations within the industry, but not 
direct competitors, may add value. This value may be in the form of a more 
accurate perspective of: (1) the industry, (2) the firm or, (3) the decisions that the 
board has made or is in the process of making.  
 Within Firm Director Knowledge – The knowledge and information that 
individual inside directors contribute to board discussion may also shift the 
allocation of the board’s attention. For example, an insider who has current or 
previous corporate venturing experience and knowledge may shift the focus of 
board attention toward more entrepreneurial strategies. 
Hypotheses: Attention Structure.  The origination of strategic entrepreneurship 
that is initiated or evaluated in the boardroom is the principle focus of this dissertation. 
As depicted in figure 1, it is hypothesized that certain board-level and firm-level 
attention structures mediate the relationship between the environment of decision and a 
board’s meeting time allocation to strategic entrepreneurial attention. The first set of 
hypotheses explores the relationship between the environment of decision and aggregate 
board breadth of knowledge (hypotheses 2a-2c). Next, board (hypotheses 4, 5a-5d) and 
firm (hypotheses 3a and 3b) attention structures are hypothesized to impact strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. Each hypothesis considers one of the afore mentioned aspects 
of the firm’s environment of decision or the board’s situational context. 
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 Hypotheses 1a – 1f examine the main effects of a firm’s environmental context 
on board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. As illustrated in Figure 1, hypotheses 
2a-2c explore the theorized mediation of this relationship via certain attention structures 
consisting of board-level and firm-level characteristics. The first step in testing this 
mediation is exploring the association between the firm’s environmental context and 
these attention structures.  
    The environment of decision is made up of a firm’s competitive industrial 
environment. When decision makers of the firm choose courses of action or inaction, 
they do so within a context of varying industrial consequence and competitor reactions. 
The following set of hypotheses suggest that the breadth of the board or the type of 
directors that sit on the board are elected at least partially because their combination of 
knowledge bases compliment the firm-environment boundary interface. Following this 
model’s logic, one can image that a firm in a very dynamic industry, such as the 
semiconductor industry, would probably seek out directors with very different 
knowledge bases than a firm in a much less dynamic industry, such as the concrete 
industry. Once the directors are selected and assembled, it seems logical that they will 
make decisions with the firm’s environmental context in mind. 
Hypothesis 2:   A firm’s environmental context 
(environment of decision) is related to its board of 
directors’ ‘breadth of knowledge’ (attention structure). 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of environmental dynamism will 
be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The level of environmental munificence 
will be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: The level of environmental complexity will 
be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. 
   
 
 Resources. Firm resources are the human, physical, technological and financial 
capital available to the firm for achieving its goals (Ocasio, 1997). They are embedded 
in the organization’s routines and capabilities and provide the organization with the 
collective skills to perform a wide variety of tasks (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Ocasio 
(1997) notes that the repertoire of answers is shaped, but not fully determined, by 
existing organizational resources. Attentional and resource constraints bias management 
toward continuing the exploitation and development of existing resources and routines. 
This is in contrast to developing new competencies, strategies and routines (March, 
1991; Ocasio, 1997). Management’s attentional constraints and biases result in a need 
for answers from individuals outside, or at the boundary, of the firm. Pure outsider 
individuals may identify novel opportunities, threats, and answers for the firm. However, 
the pure outsider’s contribution may be irrelevant to the firm’s current capabilities or 
potential future.  The novel perspective of an outsider may be a strength (insightful) or a 
weakness (irrelevant). So, how can a firm strategically identify individuals who are 
likely to contribute new, relevant issues and answers?    
 Historically, small companies and start-up ventures have been relatively skilled 
at identifying entrepreneurial opportunities. But, they have been less effective at 
developing and sustaining the competitive advantages needed to exploit those 
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opportunities over time. In contrast, more established organizations have demonstrated 
relatively superior skills in terms of developing and sustaining competitive advantages 
(Ireland et al., 2003). But, they have been less effective in recognizing entrepreneurial 
opportunities that can be exploited with their resources and resulting capabilities. In 
brief, entrepreneurial and new venture firms tend to excel at opportunity-seeking 
behavior. Established companies typically excel in the exercise of advantage-seeking 
behavior (Ireland et al., 2003). Mosakowski (2002) suggests that firms with large 
resource endowments experience problems such as core rigidities, reduced 
experimentation, lower incentives to develop new resources, and enhanced strategic 
transparency to competitors.  
 Very similar to the environmental (competitive) context presented in the first two 
sets of hypotheses, the attention based model suggests that a firm’s abundance of 
resources factor into the context in which decision makers allocate attention and 
ultimately assets. In an effort to gain a more complete picture of the environment that a 
board acts in, this study takes into consideration a firm’s overall size. As a firm grows 
larger, and inherently more complex, more issues are bound to compete for decision 
makers’ time. Within an industry, two firms of distinctly different sizes may have very 
different issues to address based on their respective sizes. Therefore, based on prior 
findings regarding firm size and entrepreneurship, the following is hypothesized related 
to the mediating impact of firm size between the environmental context and the board-
level strategic entrepreneurial attention:  
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Hypothesis 3a:  Within an industry, firm size will be 
negatively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
 
Hypothesis 3b:  Within an industry, firm size will be 
negatively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. 
 
 
 Structural Positions. Structural positions are the roles and social identification 
that specify (1) the functions and orientation of decision-makers, and (2) their inter-
relationships with other structural positions internal and external to the firm (Ocasio, 
1997). To understand directors’ attention allocations, a sense of their background is 
important. One characteristic that likely influences the perspective of directors is the 
structural positions they have occupied in the recent past and the ones they are presently 
occupying in addition to their role as a director. Structural positions provide directors 
with the interests, values and identities that regulate how they think and act when called 
upon to make or evaluate decisions. 
 Organizations have typically increased the specialization of structural positions 
because the general and task environments have become increasingly difficult to 
understand and predict for a single individual. Structural positions provide a source of 
differentiated attention to unique aspects of the organization’s environment (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967). This allows their occupants to focus their time and effort on certain issues 
and related solutions, while ignoring others (Ocasio, 1997).   
 The importance that management and shareholders give to certain issues and 
answers is partially suggested by who they nominate and elect to their firm’s board of 
directors. The nomination and election of individuals who have served in particular 
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structural positions sends a signal of perceived importance and value. In considering 
firm-level entrepreneurial strategies, there are particular structural positions that signal a 
deliberate allocation of firm attention, such as research and development, corporate 
venturing, and acquisitions. If an individual fills such a structural position in the firm 
that is deemed valuable and needed on the firm’s board of directors, a clear message of 
importance is being signaled. The absence of such an individual on the board sends a 
message of its own.   
Hypothesis 4:   The proportion of inside directors 
representing internal corporate venturing on the board will 
be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
 
 
 Small, fast-growing companies have built-in discontinuities. As every 
entrepreneur and venture capitalist knows, start-ups move through stages of growth, each 
with its own characteristics and challenges. The boards of some large corporations are 
looking for directors who are CEO’s of high-growth companies precisely for their 
experience in dealing with rapid change (Charan, 1998). Some small entrepreneurial 
companies are having success in attracting Fortune 100 CEOs to their boards because of 
the tremendous opportunity for learning (Charan, 1998). The benefit of crossing over 
between big and small companies is becoming more widely recognized, thus creating 
exciting opportunities for companies of all types and sizes. Other reasons the CEOs of 
large companies may want to serve on such boards may be the potential from stock 
options, psychic income or intellectual stimulation, and/or learning.  
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 Regardless of director’s reasons (for the purposes of the following hypotheses), it 
is proposed that the phenomena of interlocking decision-makers will increase the 
strategic entrepreneurial attention of the board and the strategic entrepreneurial actions 
of the firm. Additionally, I posit that this change in the board’s focus of attention will 
become more strategically entrepreneurial with the breadth of knowledge that each 
member integrates into the board room. Weick (1995) states that newcomers pay 
attention to what is happening and notice circumstances because they know those 
circumstances more fully. In this statement, Weick is referring to the organization as an 
entire system and a new employee that joins the firm. However, the same principle 
should apply to the board of directors. 
 Hypotheses 2a-2c examines the first step of the hypothesized board-level breadth 
of knowledge mediating relationship between a firm’s environmental context and board-
level strategic entrepreneurial attention, specifically testing the association between a 
firm’s environmental context and its board’s breadth of knowledge (see Figure 1). Here, 
hypotheses 5a-5d explore the second step of this mediating relationship by testing the 
association between a firm’s environmental context and board-level breadth of 
knowledge.  Again, through the lens of the attention based model, theory suggests that a 
board with a broader knowledge base and from a relatively more entrepreneurial 
environment is more likely to allocate more attention to strategic entrepreneurship. 
Following this reasoning, we can expect that as directors from more entrepreneurial 
contexts join the board and/or as directors from less entrepreneurial contexts leave, 
board-level attention will be increasingly allocated to strategically entrepreneurial issues.    
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Hypothesis 5a: Aggregate Board-level breadth of 
knowledge will be positively associated with board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention. 
 
Hypothesis 5b:  The proportion of outside directors who 
come) from one or more smaller firms within the same 
industry will be positively associated with board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention in the larger firm. 
 
Hypothesis 5c:  The proportion of inter-industry directors 
who come from more entrepreneurial industries will be 
positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
  
Hypothesis 5d:  The proportion of directors who come from 
a general science positions will be positively associated 
with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. 
 
 The next logical hypothesis, as suggested by the attention based model, attempts 
to build on earlier hypotheses by extending board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention to firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions. Up to this hypothesis, the 
attention based model assumes that allocation of valuable and limited board attention 
will lead to a proportional allocation of other resources. Directors’ scarce resource is 
their time and attention. They must utilize this time by only addressing the issues 
deemed to be the most important. If boards, or any other strategic decision makers, 
consistently allocate a large proportion of their attention to issues that never receive any 
firm resource allocation, then their value-added to the firm should be questioned. Thus, 
it is posited that the more attention the board allocates to strategic entrepreneurial 
decision-making, the greater the likelihood that the firm’s management will pursue 
strategic entrepreneurial actions.  
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Hypothesis 6:  The level of board attention allocated to 
strategic entrepreneurship will be positively associated 
with firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions.  
 
Issues and Answers 
Issues and answers are the cultural and cognitive repertoire of schemas available 
to decision-makers in the firm to make sense of (issues), and to respond to (answers) 
environmental stimuli. The issues confronted by the firm constitute the cognitive 
categories of problems, opportunities, and threats that make up the agenda of the firm. 
These are available to organizational decision-makers to respond to or ignore (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Ocasio, 1997).  
 As noted above, directors (inside and outside) possess schemas derived from the 
experiences associated with prior issues and answers that they bring to the board room. 
These schemas help to make sense of the current perceived firm environment. A 
cumulative set of issues and answers are present at board meetings. In addition, the 
board must have the proper situation in which they can focus their attention on the most 
important issues and answers. Therefore, a hierarchy of issues and answers tends to 
develop.  
 Corporate entrepreneurship and innovation strategies are financially demanding 
and risk intensive. Thus, the management-board relationship must be strong. It is posited 
that board of firms with recent governance concerns will focus their attention more 
monitoring and less on entrepreneurial activity.  In the face of governance problems, the 
board must shift from a strategic coaching role toward a more fiduciary at-risk role on 
behalf of the shareholders. Presumably, the stakeholders of the organization deserve to 
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see a unified leadership of top management and the board, particularly in organizations 
undergoing significant change or challenges. Nevertheless, when governance or agency 
problems have occurred (or were perceived to have occurred), directors with a perceived 
competency in monitoring and control will eventually be sought to make up the board.  
 Hypotheses:  Issues and Answers. Figure 1 depicts the occurrence of a 
moderating mediator when a governance concern is present or is perceived to be present. 
This suggests that, despite the environmental context and the mediating attention 
structures of the board and the firm, a moderating issue such as a governance problem 
usurps attentional allocation. So why do governance issues take precedence in board 
attention over strategic entrepreneurship? The answer to this issue lies in need versus 
want and confidence of other stakeholders. While you may want something, like 
organizational growth, a need, such as stopping illegal transfers of company assets, must 
be addressed first to give an organization’s stakeholders a sense of confidence in the 
organization’s decision makers. What good does it do for a firm to grow and gain assets 
on one hand, but be losing assets on the other?  
 Based on the attention based model, when an agency problem arises, it is posited 
that a board with existing competency in strategic council and/or resource dependence 
will revert to the most basic role of the board – overseeing management. 
Hypothesis 7:  The presence of a governance issue will 
negatively moderate the relationship between board of 
director ‘breadth of knowledge’ and board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. 
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Procedural and Communication Channels 
 Procedural and communication channels are the formal and informal concrete 
activities, interactions, and sentiments that induce organizational decision-makers to 
action on a selected set of issues (Ocasio, 1997). These channels create the situational 
contexts in which decision-makers allocate and focus their collective and individual 
attentions. These channels serve as conduits for the processing of issues and answers in 
the making of organizational moves. 
 The context in which the board works is crucial in determining the potential for 
director contribution to value-creation. For example, if management formally presents 
important issues to the board in a way that does not allow for candid director reactions, 
directors will have sparse opportunity to contribute. Even when they are uncomfortable 
with management’s decisions or are concerned about the company’s performance, they 
may tend not to assert themselves. Board members may not want to be singled out as an 
annoying questioner or as a person who initiates resistance to management’s plans 
(Charan, 1998). 
 Stinchcombe (1968) identifies three dimensions – spatial, temporal, and 
procedural – that shape how these organizational contexts focus the attention of 
organizational decision-makers. Spatial dimensions regulate the availability of issues 
and answers and their commonality among decision-makers. Temporal dimensions 
regulate the amount of time organizational decision-makers have available to respond 
(i.e., the duration of interaction and communications between decision-makers and the 
deadlines for response). Procedural dimensions regulate the pattern and duration of 
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attention to specific issues and answers available for consideration. Together, these three 
dimensions shape the availability and saliency (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) of issues 
and answers within specific channels (Ocasio, 1997). 
 For boards of directors, board meetings and communications among directors 
and between directors and non director management create spatial, temporal and 
procedural dimensions that structure the attention of the board. The spatial dimensions 
of concern for the board include the meetings location and the physical presence of 
directors. The temporal dimensions concerns the number of board meetings, the time of 
the meetings, and the duration of the meetings. The procedural dimensions include the 
agenda for the meeting, who sets the agenda, order of agenda, how often the agenda is 
deviated from, etc…   
 Hypotheses: Procedural and Communication Channels. The subsequent 
hypotheses derive from these three dimensions to explain a portion of the board of 
director’s ‘black box’. How do these factors affect the allocation of board attention 
amongst the board’s various roles (issues in Figure 1)?   An attention based model 
suggests that most traditional procedures and communication channels are unlikely to 
encourage entrepreneurial or innovative ideas and discussion. Rather, it is more likely 
that the routine in which policy and procedures are implemented stifle new ideas and 
discussions. Surely, these same principles are applicable to boards of directors and their 
situational contexts, which are partially created by the spatial, temporal and procedural 
dimensions of the board room environment. Below, each of these dimensions is briefly 
discussed and hypotheses are presented. 
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  First, the spatial dimension may seem to be a simplistic concept. Can the issues 
discussed by a board really be substantially affected by their physical environment? The 
following hypothesis posits just such a relationship. Individuals’ situational contexts 
frame their thinking and attention allocation. Since entrepreneurial ideas are by 
definition not routine, the typical environment of board meetings is less likely to inspire 
many entrepreneurial epiphanies. The following hypotheses are posited: 
Hypothesis 8a:  The proportion of board meetings located 
away from the corporate headquarters will be positively 
associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention. (Spatial dimension) 
 
 Second, the temporal dimension can be applied to board of director meetings by 
considering both the duration of meetings and the frequency of meetings. 
Entrepreneurial issues may be seen as “if we have time” topics for many boards. Since 
boards have a hierarchy of issues to which they need to allocate their attention, 
entrepreneurial strategies and ideas may be delayed or even dropped. Therefore, the 
more frequent the board meets and the longer the board meeting duration, the stronger 
the likelihood of entrepreneurial issues gaining the boards attention. 
Hypothesis 8b:  Board meeting frequency and duration will 
be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. (Temporal dimension) 
 
 Third, the procedures dimension attempts to structure the board’s attention 
allocation during a board meeting through the official board meeting agenda. From an 
attention based model perspective, the more detailed the time allocation of board 
meeting, the less chance of discussing entrepreneurial issues if they are not already on 
the agenda. Board agendas vary considerably in their detailed nature. Some agendas are 
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pages of detailed topics and sub-topics. Other agendas are merely a few guiding items 
and provide for more open discussion of issues. Examining this through the lens of the 
attention based model, the following relationship is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 8c:  Detail of board agenda (control of 
temporal dimension) will be negatively associated with 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. 
(Procedural dimension) 
Summary 
 An attention-based model cannot explain, by itself, the sources of the firm’s 
competitive advantage. However, combined with other theories (such as agency and 
resource dependence theories), the attention-based model may serve as an overarching 
conceptualization of how boards act in different contexts. In an attention-based model of 
the firm, decision-makers attend to the environment of action and the inputs of decision-
making. Through their attentional processing, decision-makers selectively construct the 
mental models that result in organizational moves, which are the output of decision-
making.  For the board, the focus of attention is conditional on whether, when, and how 
members participate in the boards procedural and communication channels. Participation 
is, in turn, conditional on the time, energy, and effort of decision-makers, and on the 
attentional demands on their time from other channels. Consistent with Ocasio’s (1997) 
attention based model, directors may provide knowledge of alternative issues and 
answers, as well as interests and identities that shape which issues and answers become 
salient. Who participates in a decision process shapes which issues and answers are 
attended to; and consequently, what decision-makers do (March & Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 
1997).  
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                                                          CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter provides a description of the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter IV. Accordingly, the following is organized into three 
sections: (1) sample selection and research methods; (2) measurement of primary 
variables; and (3) overview of the statistical methods. 
Sample and Research Methods 
The sample used in this study was chosen based on the set of opportunities in a 
given industry per Klevorick, Levin, Nelson and Winter (1995). These authors used data 
from the Yale Survey on Industrial Research and Development to measure the strength 
of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern inter-industry differences 
in the importance of these sources. Building on the differences identified in Klevorick et 
al. (1995), three industries were chosen with disparate contexts of opportunity from 1994 
through 2000. The first industry of interest is the rubber and plastics industry, 3000 – 
3099 in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code list. The firms in this industry, 
of which there are 224 publicly traded firms, are in a context of low opportunity 
(Klevorick et al., 1995). The second industry of interest is the furniture manufacturing 
industry, 2500 – 2599 SIC. The firms in this industry, of which there are 115 publicly 
traded firms, are in a moderate opportunity context per Klevorick et al. (1995). The final 
industry selected is the electronics industry, 3600 – 3699 SIC. The 748 firms in the 
 
 
 
     
 
98
electronics industry are characterized by Klevorick et al. (1995) as being in a high 
opportunity environment. 
 Only publicly traded firms are used because of two Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) reporting requirements: (1) information on board of director 
characteristics are typically readily available only for public firms, and (2) board minutes 
are required and are commonly of higher quality for firms accountable to the SEC. There 
are no parameters regarding size of firm, only that the firm be public. Firm size is of 
general importance whenever studying entrepreneurial efforts in existing firms and of 
particular importance in this study’s hypotheses 3 and 5a. In all other analyses, Firm size 
will be controlled for in all other analyses. 
 After identifying the industries of interest, a list was obtained of all publicly 
traded firms reporting to the SEC for fiscal year ends 1994 through 2000 from the SEC’s 
Edgar database. This database includes public companies that trade stock on the New 
York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and over-the-counter 
markets. Next, there was an exploration of the possibility of examining a random sample 
of these firms’ board minutes from 1994 – 2000 by calling firms. There was great 
reluctance from firms in allowing their board minutes outside their firm boundaries. As a 
result, I requested that their respective certified public accountants, who already have 
copies of board minutes in permanent audit files, code board minutes regarding 
opportunity identification and evaluation for this study. Of the firms contacted, 392 
agreed that their auditing firms could perform this role.  
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For each of these 392 firms, director data were obtained through publicly 
available corporate filings for fiscal years 1994 through 2000. Firm size, age, and 
research and development expenses were obtained from COMPUSTAT. This database 
was developed by Standard & Poors and is made up of over 10,000 active and 11,000 
inactive U.S. companies. The data set includes financial ratios, growth rates, 
profitability, and relative market performance. 
As detailed further below, many of the firm’s board minutes were crude in detail 
and, thus, not useful for the purposes of this study’s research questions and hypotheses. 
Also, many of the companies experienced events; such as mergers, delisting, failure to 
file with SEC, bankruptcy, etc…; which affected their continuity of reporting over the 
study’s time frame. These companies were dropped from the study. 
The final data consists of the following for all years between and including 1994-
2000: plastic and rubber industry – 50 firms and 350 firm/year observations; furniture 
industry – 45 firms and 315 firm/year observations; electronics industry – 115 firms and 
805 firm/ year observations. The final data set is complied from 8162 director/year 
observations.      
Measurement of Variables 
The present study is primarily concerned with two levels of board interaction 
relating to strategic entrepreneurship: (1) how individual board members can affect the 
attention of the entire board, and (2) how the board can affect the attention and resource 
allocation of the firm.  Further, there is an interest in understanding how the attention of 
the board and the firm exist in various contexts – both external to the board room and in 
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the board room. Accordingly, the measures are discussed in three sections: independent 
variables, dependent variables and control variables. 
 Independent Variables.  The first set of independent variables is firm-level 
contextual variables. This study utilizes the Dess and Beard (1984) view of environment 
(dynamism, munificence and complexity). It has been used in prior empirical research to 
directly test the effect of environmental characteristics on board composition (Boyd, 
1990). Data for the environmental factor variables were collected from the Census of 
Manufacturers, the Dun and Bradstreet’s Key Industry Norms Directories, and the 
Robert Morris Associates Directories. 
 The second set of independent variables requiring measurement for this study is 
board-level contextual variables. As noted in Chapter V, the spatial, temporal and 
procedural dimensions that structure the attention of the board are operationalized as:  
(1) the meeting location, (2) the physical presence of directors, (3) the number, time and 
duration of board meetings, and (4) the agenda for the meeting. The spatial (0 = on-site; 
1 = off-site) and temporal (meeting length, annual number of meetings) dimension 
variables are gathered from manual (two independent coders) and automated context 
analysis of board minutes. Also, the procedural dimension variables are obtained via 
manual context analysis of board minutes and then comparison of those minutes to board 
agendas. Some variables that were sought are:  who sets the agenda (Chairperson, 
Chair/CEO, Corporate Secretary, etc…), order of agenda, and how often the board 
deviates from the agenda and for what purposes.  The agendas will also be analyzed by 
the same CPAs who code that respective company’s board minutes. Board meeting 
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agendas, like board minutes, vary substantially in quality and detail. Board agendas, at a 
minimum, do typically state the meeting place, who set the agenda, and the procedure 
and order for the topics of discussion. More detailed agendas allocated the board 
meeting time to topics and subtopics. In extreme cases, agendas allocated time for 
discussion per person on each topic. 
 Mediating Variables. Board-level breadth of knowledge and firm size are 
hypothesized to have a mediating affect on the relationship between the environmental 
context and board-level attention allocation. The following categorical coding of board-
members is constructed as a combination of Shane’s (2000) concept of opportunity 
recognition based upon an individual’s prior knowledge and experience and Klevorick et 
al.’s (1995) noted opportunity disparity of opportunity between industries. Experience 
represents the current job and industry of a director at the time of each board meeting. If 
the directors had been in their current positions less than three years, their work histories 
are explored for an additional two years. If none of the below codes fit perfectly, the 
director’s five year experiences are averaged preceding that year’s meetings. If directors 
had retired, the experiences from the last five years of their working careers are used. 
Individual director knowledge (using recent experience as a proxy) perspectives are 
represented categorically by the following: Creditor/Attorney = 0; Insider – non 
corporate venturing = 1; Insider - corporate venturing = 2; Outsider – intra industry = 3; 
Outsider – inter industry = 4; General science = 5.  
 To gain more detail on the types/roles of insiders who sit on each company’s 
board and potentially affect boardroom attention, three separate coders were to code all 
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directors for this entire dataset as follows:  Outsider = 0; Chief Executive Officer = 1; 
Executive Vice President = 2; Chief Financial Officer = 3; Chief Operating Officer = 4; 
Non executive vice president = 5; Other type of insider = 6. All directors coded as 6 or 
‘other’ were explained in detail by the coders in the database but not parsed out further 
for purposes of this study. 
 Firm size will be measured as the natural log of each firm’s annual gross sales. 
Firm size will serve as a control variable for all hypotheses except hypothesis three, 
which sub-divides the data by two-digit SIC to consider firm size within group effects. 
 For the board meeting hypotheses, site of the meeting was coded as 0 = typical 
site of meetings (e.g. corporate headquarters) or 1 = off-site. The temporal dimensions 
were coded as number of meetings per year and how many minutes the board met for 
during the year. Finally, agenda detail (board agendas are usually prepared by the 
corporate secretary under the supervision of the chairman of the board) was coded as 
follows: 1=dense detail; 2=moderate detail; 3=sparse detail; 4=no detail.  The above 
dimensional variables were obtained from the board meeting minutes, board meeting 
agenda, SEC forms, or all. 
 Moderating Variable. As hypothesized in Chapter IV, governance problems in 
the firm may demand most, if not all, the attention of the board. To identify governance 
issues, automated content analysis was initially used to review each industry’s key trade 
journals, as well as three general business publications - Wall Street Journal, Business 
Week, and Fortune. Appendix B lists the words that were programmed into the 
automated software. In addition, shareholder proxy proposals for years 1994 through 
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2000 were reviewed to identify potential governance issues that may gain the attention 
of the board.  
 Dependent Variables. To measure board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention, 
structured content analysis (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980) of companies’ board 
minutes is used. It is widely used in the social sciences for measuring cognitions. 
Automated text analysis is based upon the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis that cognitive 
categories through which individuals attend to the world are embedded in the words they 
use (Cho & Hambrick, 2003; Sapir, 1944; Whorf, 1956).  Words that are frequently used 
are cognitively central and are presumed to reflect what is most on the user’s mind. 
Words that are used infrequently or not at all are presumed to be cognitively periphery, 
perhaps even representing uncomfortable or alien concepts (Cho & Hambrick, 2003; 
Huff, 1990).  
Text analysis has been used in numerous organizational studies, primarily 
drawing from the “letter to shareholders” in publicly-traded companies’ annual reports 
(Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Bowman, 1984; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). Some studies 
have directly tested the validity of analyzing the letters, with positive results. Letters to 
shareholders are carefully scripted documents and, therefore, should be viewed 
cautiously for meaning. In contrast, board minutes have not been constructed or 
selectively edited by management and represent a record of discussions. This study is 
interested in how free flowing this discussion tends to be and what issues are addressed.  
The usefulness of analyzing organizational communications (e.g. letter to shareholders) 
has been supported in prior empirical studies; such as competitive aggressiveness, 
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operationalized as rapid response to a competitor’s action (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; 
Chen & Macmillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994);  and total number of actions (Young, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1996). 
For this study, approximately 250 accountants reviewed and coded board 
minutes. Each set of minutes had two reviewers. Additionally, upon receipt of the last 
coding for a set of minutes, one of the two reviewers for the common set of minutes was 
sent automated text analysis software. This software was preprogrammed with 
“indicator” words – “entrepreneurial”, “innovate”, “expansion”, “growth”, etc…. 
Appendix A is a complete list of the words used to verify that all items of interest were 
identified by the two reviewers. If an item was found that had been excluded by one or 
both the reviews, each reviewer reexamined the previously excluded item. Attention paid 
to the strategic entrepreneurial indicators was used to measure strategic management 
attention. 
In addition to identifying the occurrence of strategic entrepreneurship issues in 
board discussions, reviewers recorded how much of the board meeting was allocated to 
discussing specific issues (strategic entrepreneurship, governance, financing, etc…).  
The time spent as a proportion of total board time was coded as board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. Approximately two-thirds of the board minutes document the 
board meeting time in a very detailed manner (usually dictated minutes). The remaining 
minutes were less detailed in who said what and how long each topic was discussed.  
Firms with less detailed minutes were dropped for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Therefore, coders examined the amount of text for each topic and estimated how much 
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of the entire meeting was spent on it. The subjective coder estimation presents a 
limitation on the value of these minutes. To control for this issue, less detailed minutes 
went through the regular process of dual coding and, in addition, were reviewed by a 
third coder when differences between coders of more than ten percent of the entire board 
meeting time were encountered.   
Prior to examining the board minutes of this study’s sample, coders were trained 
on how to code through the use of board minutes from non sample companies. Inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen’s kappa) for the coders was .78.  After additional discussions and 
further training of coders (by identifying key terms and how to code each term), they 
coded a second set of minutes. This resulted in an improved inter-rater reliability of .89. 
Coders were instructed to identify key topics and code how long each director 
commented on: (1) strategic entrepreneurship issues, (2) who supported and opposed 
related ideas, (3) how much time in the meeting was spent on strategic entrepreneurship 
issues, (4) did the topic resonate at subsequent meetings, and (5) did the discussion result 
in firm-level resource allocation (if so, what type)? 
Firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions serve as final dependant variable. 
Organizational attributes, such as entrepreneurial strategy-making processes or 
characteristics of the management team, may only facilitate (or impede) entrepreneurial 
activity. They do not make an organization entrepreneurial (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 
2000). Similarly, the mere intentions of the board are of little value without subsequent 
firm actions or behaviors that support the creation of related strategies, structures and 
other organizational phenomena. Therefore, the measurement of these organizational 
 
 
 
     
 
106
actions and behaviors is important to the question of whether boards matter and make a 
strategic difference to a firm. 
Trade journals are among the communication and procedural channels through 
which industry attention is structured. They provide analyses of events and issues as well 
as perspectives to the readers on their relative importance (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). 
Research on the impact of trade journals shows that their structural position provides a 
shared reference for knowledge transfer among industry constituents (Nederhof & 
Meijer, 1995). This makes them a channel of communication in the early stages of 
industry-related strategy process (Hollifield, 1997) and a common reservoir for available 
information and interpretations. As such, trade journals play multiple roles in attentional 
processes. First, they act as a common source of information, creating a historical record 
relevant to their readership based on both insiders’ and outsiders’ interpretations this 
information. Second, they act as an internal constituent of an industry, suggesting which 
events and issues to attend to and offering analysis and interpretation of their criticality. 
Third, they act as conduits to other communication channels and public arenas, such as 
political bodies and the general public. Trade journals actively scan other public media 
for their coverage of industry issues and events. They often record outsiders’ accounts of 
industry activities and industry reputation, thereby serving as linkages between 
outsiders’ and insiders’ public attention (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).  
 As the source for strategic entrepreneurship action data, automated structured 
content analysis is used to review firm-level strategic entrepreneurship actions or 
behaviors as documented through trade journals in the rubber and plastics industry, the 
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furniture manufacturing industry and the electronics industry. Similar indicator words 
are used in the analysis of board minutes. These journals were reviewed from 1994 
through 2002. This nine year time period should encompass any firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions that result from board meetings quickly, as well as any that have 
up to a two year lag effect (for review of minutes for years 1999 and 2000).  
 In addition to the content analysis of firm trade journals, the allocation of internal 
resources, as evident from board minutes, were analyzed. These allocations of resources 
often take the form of hiring an outside consultant or assigning the exploration of an 
opportunity to a board sub-committee. This sub-committee then reports back to the 
board. This study will investigate the intersection of the committee and the board. 
However, more detail on committee meetings was unavailable. Nevertheless, the 
allocation of limited resources, be it financial capital or human capital, inherently 
indicates priority of an issue.    
 Control Variables.  Board size is calculated as the total number of directors on 
the board. The literature on group size suggests that larger groups are difficult to manage 
(Gladstein, 1984), have difficulty reaching consensus due to diversity, experience 
increased conflict (Oreilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989), and have limited information-
processing abilities (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). The effect of board size on board 
participation in prior research is mixed. Some scholars suggest that board participation is 
negatively associated board size on topical depth but positively associated with board 
size on topical breadth (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
 
 
 
     
 
108
 Evidence from prior research concerning the effect of firm age on board decision 
making is unclear (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Organization age is  the number of 
years between its founding and the present. Researchers (Lynall et al., 2003; Zald, 1967) 
have suggested that boards of newer firms may take a more active role. The only 
empirical test of this perspective found a positive relationship between organization age 
and board participation in strategic decision making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). 
However, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) findings came from their study of hospital boards, 
which may be very different than boards of other firms. Therefore, generalizability is 
questionable. In this study, the age of a firm is measured by years since founding, as 
reported in Who Owns Whom – Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
 Board’s Relative Power is another control variable that prior literature notes as 
important. This concept is controlled for through the following two variables. (1) Board 
relative tenure, which is calculated by taking the average of the sum of each director’s 
board tenure then dividing the sum by the CEO’s tenure. (2) Percentage of outsider 
director stock ownership, which is calculated as the number of shares owned by 
outsiders divided by the total number of outstanding shares. 
Overview of Statistical Methods 
As illustrated in Figure 1, as well as the hypotheses, this study explores two 
distinct dependent variables. These variables are distinct theoretically and by empirical 
measure. Most of the hypotheses suggest directional cause and effect relationships from 
environmental and board meeting contexts toward board-level entrepreneurial attention 
allocation. Entrepreneurial attention is measured as a percentage of annual board 
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meeting time spent in discussing potential opportunities for the firm. Therefore, this 
variable is continuous and lends itself to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. Regression equations were estimated with and without control variables in an 
effort to partition the variance explained in board-level entrepreneurial attention 
allocation that might be attributed to the environmental, organization, and/or board 
factors and contexts.  
In contrast to the entrepreneurial attention dependent variable, the entrepreneurial 
action variable is measured in count terms. Upon completion of the dataset, it was 
determined, as expected, that this dependent variable was heavily skewed by many zero 
observations. Therefore, to accommodate for both the count nature of the data as well as 
the negative skew of the dataset, I utilized negative binomial regression to estimate the 
relationships in hypothesis six and the main effects of the environmental context in 
hypotheses one b, d, and e. As with the earlier analysis, regression equations were 
estimated with and without control variables in an effort to partition the variance 
explained in firm-level entrepreneurial actions that might be attributed to the 
environmental and organizational contexts and board-level entrepreneurial attention 
allocations. Statistical results are presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Exploratory Statistics and Diagnostics 
 This chapter presents the results of the analyses conducted to test the eight 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter IV. Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1 and 
bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 2 on pages 112 and 113. A summary table 
reporting the findings of the hypotheses is presented in Table 3 on page 114. The 
remaining tables present results of multiple regression analyses, utilized for hypotheses 
with ‘board-level entrepreneurial attention’ or director ‘breadth of knowledge’ as the 
dependent variable, and negative binomial regression, utilized for hypotheses with ‘firm-
level entrepreneurial actions’ as the dependent variable.  
 During the initial exploration of the data, regression diagnostics were performed 
to ensure that the data is in accord with the basic assumptions of the classic linear 
regression model. There were a variety of expected bivariate correlations between the 
independent variables, as presented in the correlation table. A further examination of the 
data revealed some outlying data points that appeared to have a potentially influential 
effect on the analysis. Upon additional analyses in which I excluded the points, they did 
not have a material effect on the analysis, even the outliers in aggregate. Consequently, 
these observations are included in the overall dataset. 
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Variable Name N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Environmental Munificence 1470 0.25 1.73 1.05 0.31
Environmental Dynamism 1470 0.31 2.76 0.92 0.52
Environmental Complexity 1470 1.50 17.50 5.29 4.04
BOD Breadth of Knowledge 1470 0.14 3.89 2.17 0.79
Corporate Ventureing Insider % 1470 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.02
Intra-Industry Director % 1470 0.00 0.83 0.22 0.19
Inter-Industry Director % 1470 0.00 0.91 0.26 0.23
Gen. Science Director % 1470 0.00 0.40 0.03 0.07
Organizational Size 1470 -4.09 13.90 5.27 2.35
Org. Outstanding Stock 1470 -0.54 4.07 1.83 0.70
Org. Research & Development Exp. 1470 0.00 1.12 0.52 0.45
Relative Board Tenure 1470 0.03 23.30 1.40 1.95
Outside Board Ownership 1470 0.00 72.00 34.83 19.69
Organiation Age 1470 4.00 87.00 29.60 24.07
Governance issue 1470 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.18
Number of Board Meeting per Year 1470 3.00 6.00 4.37 0.71
% of Board Meetings Off-Site 1470 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.09
Meeting Time per Year 1470 385.00 2200.00 1252.50 431.65
Agenda Detail 1470 1.00 4.00 2.36 1.24
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention % 1470 -6.36 -1.09 -2.66 0.66
Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions 1470 0.00 0.89 0.37 0.34
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Entrepreneurial Actions  
2 Entrepreneurial Attention 0.5835**  
3 Research & Devp. Exp. 0.3690** 0.2468***  
4 Board Size 0.3367 0.2958 0.3815  
5 Outstanding Stock 0.3988 0.3278 0.5235 0.4742  
6 Net Sales 0.4633 0.4359 0.4875 0.6385*** 0.6366  
7 Agenda Detail 0.5332** 0.4036** 0.3521 0.3244** 0.3996 0.4347  
8 Meeting Time 0.3906 0.3290 0.3308 0.3329 0.3081 0.4045** 0.6540*  
9 % Off-Site 0.0230* -0.0604 0.1133* 0.0904 0.1283 0.1264 0.4010 0.3349  
10 # of Board Meetings 0.3874 0.3667 0.2865 0.2930 0.2946 0.3697** 0.5503** 0.8604* 0.3440  
11 Corporate Venture % -0.0365 -0.0501 0.0170** -0.0767 -0.1002 -0.0946* -0.0154 0.0282 -0.0204 0.0166  
12 Breadth of Knowledge 0.4505** 0.3174** 0.3680 0.3329 0.3485 0.4173 0.4399 0.4319 0.1362** 0.3684 -0.0173
13 Outside Dir. Ownership -0.1394 -0.1159 -0.0452 -0.0551 0.0394 -0.0941 -0.0527*** 0.0790** 0.1976 0.1568 0.0093
14 Relative Board Tenure 0.1234 0.0962 0.1750 0.1007 0.0840 0.0804 0.0566 0.0279 -0.0090 0.0328 -0.0271
15 Organization Age -0.0045 -0.0137** 0.0735 -0.0025 0.0441** 0.0701* 0.0557** 0.0363 0.0310 0.0394 -0.0065***
16 Governance Issue(s) -0.0814** -0.0649* -0.0256** 0.0431** 0.0008 -0.0410 -0.0198 0.0122 0.0662 0.0191 0.0148
17 Environmental Complexity 0.0527 -0.0374 0.0468 -0.0184 0.0215 0.0574 0.1244 0.0977 0.0499 0.0685 -0.0614
18 Environmental Dynamism 0.1524* 0.0882** 0.0732* -0.0550 0.0300 0.0572 0.1207 0.0747 0.0322** 0.0616* -0.0244
19 Environmental Munificence0.1037* -0.0292 -0.0044 -0.0587 -0.0115 -0.0778 0.1009 0.0965 0.0620** 0.0741*** 0.0436
20 Inter-Industry Director % 0.4747* 0.3047 0.3295 0.4152 0.3538 0.4774 0.5463 0.4495 0.1834* 0.3916 -0.0698
21 Intra-Industry Director % -0.2651 -0.2140 -0.0157 -0.1627 -0.1276 -0.1946 -0.2884 -0.1365 -0.1190 -0.1495 0.0118
22 Gen. Science Director % 0.1780** 0.2151 0.1357* 0.1493 0.2743 0.2131 0.1633 0.1643 0.0333*** 0.1671 -0.0280
  +    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001  
TABLE 2
Correlations
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Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Entrepreneurial Actions
2 Entrepreneurial Attention
3 Research & Devp. Exp.
4 Board Size
5 Outstanding Stock
6 Net Sales
7 Agenda Detail
8 Meeting Time
9 % Off-Site
10 # of Board Meetings
11 Corporate Venture %
12 Breadth of Knowledge  
13 Outside Dir. Ownership -0.0040  
14 Relative Board Tenure 0.0117 -0.0194  
15 Organization Age 0.0485 0.0035 -0.0700  
16 Governance Issue(s) -0.0100 0.0177 0.0062 -0.0086  
17 Environmental Complexity 0.0342*** -0.0365 0.0115 -0.1446 -0.0722  
18 Environmental Dynamism 0.1451** -0.0115 -0.0140** 0.0222 -0.0165 0.1905***  
19 Environmental Munificence0.0531* -0.0257 -0.0236** -0.0256 0.1007 -0.0523 -0.4042  
20 Inter-Industry Director % 0.7540* -0.0348 0.0370 0.0818 -0.0181** 0.0628 0.1142* 0.0289**  
21 Intra-Industry Director % 0.1270** 0.0964 0.0160 -0.1138 0.0005 -0.0380 -0.0224 0.0261* -0.4255  
22 Gen. Science Director % 0.3219* -0.0520 -0.0416 0.0654 -0.0108 -0.0202 0.0436* -0.0363 0.0226 -0.1166
  +    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
TABLE 2 (continued)
Correlations
 
 
 
     
 
14
H1a
The level of environmental dynamism will be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. supported
H1b
The level of environmental dynamism will be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. supported
H1c
The level of environmental munificence will be positively associated with board-level of strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. supported
H1d
The level of environmental munificence will be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. supported
H1e
The level of environmental complexity will be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. not supported
H1f
The level of environmental complexity will be positively associated with firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. not supported
 
H2a
The level of environmental dynamism will be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. supported
H2b
The level of environmental munificence will be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. supported
H2c
The level of environmental complexity will be positively associated with board-level ‘breadth of 
knowledge’. not supported
  
H3a
Within an industry, firm size will be negatively associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention. not supported
H3b
Within an industry, firm size will be negatively associated with firm-level strategic entrepreneurial 
actions. not supported
 
H4
The proportion of inside directors representing internal corporate venturing on the board will be positively 
associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. not supported
H5a
Aggregate Board-level breadth of knowledge will be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. supported
H5b
The proportion of outside directors who come) from one or more smaller firms within the same industry 
will be positively associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention in the larger firm. not supported
H5c
The proportion of inter-industry directors who come from more entrepreneurial industries will be 
positively associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. supported
H5d
The proportion of directors who come from a general science positions will be positively associated with 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. supported
H6
The level of board attention allocated to strategic entrepreneurship will be positively associated with firm-
level strategic entrepreneurial actions. supported
 
H7
The presence of a governance issue will negatively moderate the relationship between board of director 
‘breadth of knowledge’ and board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. supported
 
H8a
The proportion of board meetings located away from the corporate headquarters will be positively 
associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. not supported
H8b
Board meeting frequency and duration will be positively associated with board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. partial support
H8c Detail of board agenda  will be negatively associated with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. supported
TABLE 3
Summary of the Results of Hypotheses Testing
Results
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 The following regression diagnostics were also performed with Stata 8.2: 
heteroskedasticity (Cook and Weisberg’s test), normality (skewness and kurtosis tests), 
and multicollinearity (variance inflation factors and tolerance values). First, based upon 
the Cook and Weisberg test of heteroskedasticity, it appears that the assumption of 
homoskedasticity is not violated.  Second, the normality of error term doesn’t appear to 
be a problem as the sample size of 1470 firm-year observations is reasonably large. 
Although the independent variables and dependent variables were not transformed, many 
of the control variables; such as net sales, outstanding stock, research and development 
expense, relative board power, and board size; were transformed to approximate  normal 
distributions. Third, upon examination of the multicollinearity tests, some of the control 
variables had tolerance levels near .40. Therefore, I chose a method of model calculation 
and presentation in which highly correlated control variables were entered separately to 
avoid multicollinearity problems.   
 In addition to the data exploration above, the control and independent variables 
of those firms that did allow their board minutes and those that did not allow their board 
minutes to be coded were calculated and analyzed. There were no significant differences 
noted. The interpreted results and tables for each individual hypothesis are presented in 
the following sections. 
Hypotheses 1a, 1c and 1e  
 Table 4 presents the findings of an OLS regression equation which considers the 
potential impact that a firm’s industrial context may have on the percentage of time that 
boards of directors allocate to discussing and evaluating strategic entrepreneurial 
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opportunities. This corresponds to Hypotheses 1a, 1c and 1e, measuring the industrial 
context via munificence, dynamism, and complexity. Models 1, 2 and 3 present the 
control variables for the equation, with highly correlated control variables entered 
separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. Model 4 adds the industrial environment 
variables hypothesized to affect the amount of time that boards allocate to strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. The results in Table 4 suggest that both environmental 
munificence and environmental dynamism are positively and significantly (both at the 
.001 alpha level) related to board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention allocation 
during board meeting. Therefore, hypotheses 1a and 1c are strongly supported. However, 
hypothesis 1e, which posits that environmental complexity will also be positively and 
significantly related to board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention allocation, was 
found to be positive but not significant. Hence, hypothesis 1e was not supported. 
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Intercept             -.0300*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.0422*** (.0090) -.1098*** (.0121)
Firm Size .0079*** (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0070*** (.0010)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0094*** (.0029)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0172*** (.0038)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -00003 (.0000)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0023** (.0008)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) .0001 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0124* (.0121)
Environment Munificence .0355*** (.0051)
Environment Dynamism .0192*** (.0031)
Environment Complexity .0006 (.0004)
F-Value
Model R-square
Adjusted R-Square
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
TABLE 4
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention 
(Testing Hypotheses 1a, 1c & 1e)
Environmental Context and Entrepreneurial Attention
Results of OLS Regression Models
Model 4
51.78***
.2620
.2569.2207
61.79***
.2283
.2283
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1
139.51***
.2221
.2205
Model 2 Model 3
105.00***
.2228
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Hypotheses 1b, 1d and 1f  
 Table 5 presents the findings of a negative binomial regression equation which 
considers the potential impact that a firm’s industrial context may have on the number of 
strategic entrepreneurial actions in which a firm engages. This corresponds to 
Hypotheses 1b, 1d and 1f, again measuring the industrial context via munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity. Models 1, 2 and 3 present the control variables for the 
equation, with highly correlated control variables entered separately to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. Model 4 adds the industrial environment variables 
hypothesized to affect the number of firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions. The 
results in Table 5 suggest that both environmental munificence and environmental 
dynamism are positively and significantly (both at the .001 alpha level) related to firm-
level strategic entrepreneurial actions. Therefore, hypotheses 1b and 1d are both strongly 
supported. However, hypothesis 1f, which posits that environmental complexity will be 
positively and significantly related to firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions, was 
found to be positive but not significant. Hence, hypothesis 1f was not supported. 
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Intercept             -1.9580*** (.1343) -1.8790*** (.1486) -1.8620*** (.2581) -3.0958*** (.3402)
Firm Size .2569*** (.0265) .2584*** (.0265) .2420*** (.0304) .2342*** (.0300)
Firm Outstanding Stock .1304 (.0878) .1179 (.0882) .1400 (.0884) .1484+ (.0873)
Firm R&D Expense .6812*** (.6812) .6845*** (.1105) .6108*** (.1124) .5372*** (.1123)
Firm Age  -.0023 (.0018) -.0018 (.0018) -.0021 (.0018)
Relative Board Tenure .0427* (.0203) .0506** (.0200)
Outside Director Ownership -.0060** (.0021) -.0051* (.0021)
Board size .0835 (.2581) .1453 (.1250)
Environment Munificence .7427*** (.1453)
Environment Dynamism .4294*** (.0910)
Environment Complexity -.0144 (.0105)
Alpha 1.5240 (.1124) 1.5128 (.1124) 1.4729 (.1106) 1.3703 (.1062)
LR chi2 392.54*** 394.03*** 407.25*** 443.36***
Log likelihood -2111.0422 -2110.2979 -2103.6879 -2085.6360
Pseudo R-square .0851 .0854 .0883 .0961
Change in Pseudo R-Square  .0003 .0029 .0078
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
(Testing Hypotheses 1b, 1d & 1f)
Environmental Context and Entrepreneurial Actions
TABLE 5
Results of Negative Binomial Regression Models
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4Variable
Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions
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Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c 
 Table 6 presents the findings of an OLS regression equation with board-level 
breadth of knowledge (the average of all the directors’ recent experiences relative to the 
firm’s current contextual situation) as the dependent variable. This corresponds to 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c, which test the effects of the industrial environment 
(munificence, dynamism and complexity) on board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention. Models 1, 2 and 3 present the control variables for the equation, with highly 
correlated control variables entered separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
Model 4 adds in the environmental context variables of environmental munificence, 
environmental dynamism and environmental complexity. The results in Table 6 suggest 
that both environmental munificence and environmental dynamism are positively and 
significantly (both at the .001 alpha level) related to the board breadth of knowledge 
construct. Therefore, hypotheses 2a and 2b are both strongly supported. However, 
hypothesis 2c, which posits that environmental complexity is positively and significantly 
related to board breadth of knowledge, was found to be positive but not significant. 
Hence, hypothesis 2c was not supported. 
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Intercept             1.3564*** (.0540) 1.3463*** (.0576) 1.0794*** (.1109) .3057* (.1495)
Firm Size .0933*** (.0104) .0933*** (.0104) .0790*** (.0119) .0772*** (.0117)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0783* (.0361) .0786* (.0361) .0630+ (.0364) .0561 (.0357)
Firm R&D Expense .3469*** (.0494) .3457*** (.0495) .3555*** (.0500) .3192*** (.0492)
Firm Age  .0003 (.0007) .0004 (.0008) .0004 (.0007)
Relative Board Tenure -.0222* (.0096) -.0190* (.0094)
Outside Director Ownership .0012 (.0009) .0014 (.0009)
Board size .1553** (.0542) .2140*** (.0537)
Environment Munificence .3937*** (.0634)
Environment Dynamism .2873*** (.0389)
Environment Complexity -.0020 (.0046)
F-Value 131.63*** 98.73*** 58.94*** 49.78***
Model R-square .2122 .2123 .2201 .2544
Adjusted R- squared .2106 .2102 .2164 .2493
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 6
Model 4
Board-Level Breadth of Knowledge
(Testing Hypotheses 2a, 2b & 2c)
Environmental Context and Attention Structures 
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Hypothesis 3a 
 Table 7 presents the findings of an OLS regression equation with board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention as the dependent variable and firm size, categorized by 
two-digit SIC codes for each of the three industries, as the independent variable of 
interest. This equation corresponds to Hypothesis 3a, testing the effects of intra-
industrial relative firm size on boards’ strategic entrepreneurial attention percentage. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 present the control variables for each industry’s equation, with highly 
correlated control variables entered separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
Model 4 adds in firm size. The results in Table 7 suggest that firm size does have a 
significant relationship with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention within each of 
the three industries. Although Hypothesis 3a posits a negative relationship between firm 
size and board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention, the results suggest a positive and 
significant relationship. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
Hypothesis 3b 
 Table 8 presents the findings of a negative binomial regression equation with 
firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions as the dependent variable and firm size 
(consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the sample firms are separated by their two-digit SIC 
codes) as the independent variable. The control variables and independent variable were 
entered in the same sequence as they were in Hypothesis 3a and led to similar results. 
The results in Table 8 suggest that intra-industry firm size and firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions are significantly related, but positively rather than negatively as 
hypothesized. Consequently, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept             
-.0076 
(.0077)
-.0012 
(.0083)
-.0183 
(.0159)
-.0047 
(.0152)
-.0379*** 
(.0052)
-.0720*** 
(.0100)
-.1176*** 
(.0202)
-.0991*** 
(.0201)
-.0172** 
(.0061)
-.0125* 
(.0064)
-.0614*** 
(.0126)
-.0466*** 
(.0127)
Firm 
Outstanding 
Stock
.0151*** 
(.0047)
.0154*** 
(.0047)
.0115+ 
(.0054)
-.0130+ 
(.0066)
.0445*** 
(.0052)
.0503*** 
(.0051)
.0448*** 
(.0053)
.0375*** 
(.0054)
.0200*** 
(.0036)
-0207*** 
(.0036)
.0171*** 
(.0037)
.0079* 
(.0040)
Firm R&D 
Expense
.0277*** 
(.0078)
.0262*** 
(.0078)
.0209** 
(.0081)
.0137+ 
(.0078)
.0249*** 
(.0078)
.0249*** 
(.0074)
.0190** 
(.0076)
.0084 
(.0077)
.0368*** 
(0060)
.0386*** 
(.0060)
.0247*** 
(.0063)
.0203*** 
(.0062)
Firm Age  
-.0002* 
(.0001)
-.0003* 
(.0001)
-.0002 
(.0001)
.0008*** 
(.0001)
.0008*** 
(.0001)
.0007*** 
(.0001)
-.0002 ** 
(.0001)
-.0002+ 
(.0001)
-.0002** 
(.00008)
Relative Board 
Tenure
.0021+ 
(.0012)
.0020+ 
(.0012)
-.0012 
(.0018)
-.0012 
(.0017)
.0042*** 
(.0011)
.0044*** 
(.0011)
Outside Director 
Ownership
-.00001 
(.0001)
-.0001 
(.0001)
-.0002 
(.0001)
-.0001 
(.0001)
-.0001 
(.0001)
.00003 
(.0001)
Board size
.0100 
(.0076)
-.0136+ 
(.0082)
.0275** 
(.0088)
.0110 
(.0093)
.0268*** 
(.0057)
.0119* 
(.0063)
Firm Size    
.0156*** 
(.0026)
.0073*** 
(.0016)
.0070*** 
(.0013)
F-Value 26.85*** 19.49*** 10.57*** 15.11*** 73.32*** 65.94*** 35.60*** 35.10 71.99*** 50.78*** 32.80*** 32.96***
Model R-square .1468 .1583 .1708 .2562 .2971 .3638 .3837 .4181 .1522 .1598 .1978 .2245
Adjusted R- 
squared .1414 .1502 .1546 .2393  .2930 .3583 .3730 .4062 .1501 .1566 .1918 .2177
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Furniture Industry Plastic & Rubber Industry  Electronics Industry
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable
TABLE 7
Intra-Industry Firm Size and Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 3a)
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Results of OLS Regression Models
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept             
-1.2966*** 
(.3308)
-1.2547*** 
(.3497)
-1.9097** 
(.6407)
-1.9691** 
(.6288)
-1.4671*** 
(.2102)
-2.4069*** 
(.3000)
-4.1327*** 
(.5801)
-3.5238*** 
(.5226)
-1.6815*** 
(.1881)
-1.4806*** 
(.1959)
-2.1486*** 
(.3416)
-1.7294*** 
(.3526)
Firm Outstanding Stock
.3295+ 
(.1983)
.3341+ 
(1985)
.1241 
(.2522)
-.5864+ 
(.3225)
.7993*** 
(.1133)
1.0085*** 
(.1225)
.8535*** 
(.1259)
.4137*** 
(.1277)
.5558*** 
(.1046)
.5511*** 
(.1041)
.8907*** 
(.1741)
.1445 
(.1249)
Firm R&D Expense
1.0220*** 
(.2926)
1.0093*** 
(.2947)
.9238** 
(.3005)
.7106* 
(.2957)
.9026*** 
(.1775)
.9267*** 
(.1756)
.6459*** 
(.1805)
-.1057 
(.1927)
1.1245*** 
(.1666)
1.1896*** 
(.1671)
.8907*** 
(.1741)
.7864*** 
(.1732)
Firm Age  
-.0018 
(.0049)
-.0015 
(.0049)
.0032 
(.0049)  
.0168*** 
(.0038)
.0146*** 
(.0038)
.0115*** 
(.0033)  
-.0082*** 
(.0024)
-.0076** 
(0024)
-.0085*** 
(.0024)
Relative Board Tenure
.0146 
(.0317)
.0191 
(.0303)
.0373 
(.0509)
.0211 
(.0429)
.0735* 
(.0289)
.0693* 
(.0286)
Outside Director Ownership
.0008 
(.0058)
.0002 
(0055)
-.0089** 
(.0035)
-.0096** 
(.0031)
-.0085** 
(.0030)
-.0063* 
(.0030)
Board size
.4160 
(.3189)
-.0443 
(.3364)
.9921*** 
(.2384)
.3602 
(.2271)
.5559*** 
(.1539)
.1059 
(.1777)
Firm Size    
.4048*** 
(.1143)    
.3788*** 
(.0534)    
.2112*** 
(.3526)
Alpha
1.9251 
(.3518)
.6537 
(.1828)
1.8578 
(.3482)
1.6237 
(.3202)
1.2232 
(.1742)
1.1319 
(.1600)
.9869 
(.1443)
.5722 
(.1101)
1.8189 
(.0950)
1.7408 
(.1690)
1.5747 
(.1593)
1.4910 
(.1016)
LR chi2 39.37*** 39.50*** 41.41*** 54.38*** 123.54*** 143.35*** 165.63*** 217.72*** 143.72*** 154.60*** 183.38*** 210.02***
Log likelihood -367.4288 -367.3633 -366.4094 -359.9218 -595.6180 -585.7103 -574.5708 -548.5288 -1170.6439 -1165.2039 -1150.8132 -1137.4939
Pseudo R-square .0508 .0510 .0535 .0702 .0940 .1090 .1260 .1656 .0578 .0622 .0738 .0845
Change in Pseudo R-Square  .0002 .0025 .0167 .0150 .0170 .0396 .0044 .0116 .0107
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Furniture Industry
TABLE 8
Intra-Industry Firm Size and Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions
(Testing Hypothesis 3b)
Plastic & Rubber Industry  Electronics Industry
Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions
Results of Negative Binomial Regression Models
Variable
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Hypothesis 4 
 Table 9 on page 127 presents the findings of an OLS regression equation which 
considers the impact of corporate venturing insider directors, as a percentage of the total 
board,  on board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. This equation corresponds to 
Hypothesis 4. Models 1, 2 and 3 present the control variables for the equation, with 
highly correlated control variables entered separately to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. Model 4 adds the corporate venturing director percentage hypothesized to 
affect the amount of time that boards allocate to strategic entrepreneurial attention. The 
results in Table 9 suggest that the corporate venturing insider percentage is positively 
related to board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention, but not significantly. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d 
 Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13 present the results for Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d 
respectively. The findings for each of these four OLS regressions use board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention as the dependent variable. They were calculated by 
first entering control variables in Models 1, 2 and 3 and ultimately by entering the 
specific independent variable of interest in Model 4.  
 Table 10 on page 128 presents the results for Hypothesis 5a. It posits that 
aggregate board-level breadth of knowledge will be positively related to board-level 
allocation toward strategic entrepreneurial attention. The results presented suggest that 
board-level breadth of knowledge is both positively and significantly (.001) related to 
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the amount of time boards spend on strategic entrepreneurial attention. Hypothesis 5a is 
strongly supported. 
 Table 11 on page 129 presents the results for Hypothesis 5b. It posits that intra-
industry director percentage will be positively related to a board’s time allocation toward 
strategic entrepreneurial attention. The results suggest that intra-industry director 
percentage is significantly (.001) related to the amount of board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention, but negatively. Therefore, Hypothesis 5b is not supported. 
 Table 12 on page 130 presents the results for Hypothesis 5c. It posits that inter-
industry director percentage will be positively related to board-level time allocation 
toward strategic entrepreneurial attention. The results presented suggest that inter-
industry director percentage is both positively and significantly (.001) related to the 
amount of board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. Therefore, Hypothesis 5c is 
strongly support 
 Table 13 on page 131 presents the results for Hypothesis 5d. It posits that general 
science director percentage will be positively related to board-level time allocation 
toward strategic entrepreneurial attention. The results suggest that general science 
director percentage is both positively and significantly (.001) related to the amount of 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. Therefore, Hypothesis 5d is strongly 
supported. 
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Intercept             -.02997*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.04218*** (.0090) -.0432*** (.0090)
Firm Size .0079***   (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0072*** (.0010)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0103*** (.0030)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0198*** (.0041)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0021** (.0001)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) -.00002 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0078+ (.0044)
Corporate Venture Director .0894 (0741)
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 54.27***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .2291
Change in R-Square  .0007 .0055 .0008
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 4)
Corporate Venture Director and Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Variable Model 4Model 3Model 2Model 1
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 9
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Intercept             -.02997*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.04218*** (.0047) -.0677*** (.0089)
Firm Size .0079*** (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0052*** (.0009)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0086** (.0028)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0118** (.0039)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0026*** (.0007)
Outside Director 
Ownership -.00002 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0039 (.0042)
Board of Director Breadth 
of Knowledge .0236*** (.0236)
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 76.11***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .2941
Change in R-Square  .0007 .0055 .0658
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 10
Model 4
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 5a)
Board's Breadth of Knowledge and Board-Level Entreprenurial Attention
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Intercept             -.02997*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.04218*** (.0090) -.0180* (.0092)
Firm Size .0079*** (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0063*** (.0009)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0090** (.0029)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0240*** (.0040)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001+ (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0021** (.0008)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) .00003 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0051 (.0043)
Intra-Industry Director Percentage -.0664*** (.0078)
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 65.89***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .2651
Change in R-Square  .0007 .0055 .0368
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
(Testing Hypothesis 5b)
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 11
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 4Model 3Model 2Model 1
Intra-Industry Director % and Board-Level Entreprenurial Attention
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Intercept             -.02997*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.0422*** (.0090) -0255** (.0084)
Firm Size .0079***     (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0041*** (.0010)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0091*** (.0027)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0147*** (.0038)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001+ (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0021** (.0008)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) .0023** (.0007)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) -.0019 (.0041)
Inter-Industry Director Percentage .1040*** (.0070)
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 89.55***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .3290
Change in R-Square  .0007 .0055 .1007
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 5c)
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 12
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inter-Industry Director % and Board-Level Entreprenurial Attention
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Intercept             -.0300*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.0422*** (.0090) -.0408*** (.0089)
Firm Size .0079***  (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0070*** (.0010)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0078** (.0030)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0205*** (.0040)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0022** (.0008)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0075+ (.0044)
General Science Director Percentage .0945*** (.0233)
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 56.69***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .2327
Change in R-Square  .0007 .0055 .0044
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 13
Model 4
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 5d)
General Science Director % and Board-Level Entreprenurial Attention
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Hypothesis 6 
 Table 14 on page 134 presents the findings of a negative binomial regression 
equation with firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions as the dependent variable and 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention as the independent variable. This table and 
equation test Hypothesis 6. The control variables and independent variable were entered 
in the same manner as in previous hypotheses (first, organization control variables; 
second, organizational age to parse out variance and avoid multicollinearity; third, board 
control variables; fourth, the independent variable of interest). Table 14 results suggest 
that board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention and firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions are positively and significantly (.001 level) related. 
Consequently, Hypothesis 6 is strongly supported. 
Hypothesis 7 
 Table 15 on page 136 presents the results for the hypothesized moderating 
impact of governance issues between attention structures (firm size, aggregate breadth of 
knowledge, and type of director percentage: corporate venturing, intra-industry, inter-
industry, or general science) and time spent on board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention.   
 To test the moderation between the mediator, board breadth of knowledge, and 
strategic entrepreneurial attention, the moderator variable identification procedure 
recommended by Sharma, Durand and Gurarie (1981) was implemented. Concisely 
stated, these authors suggest that tests of moderation should proceed in multiple steps. 
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First, moderated regression should be used to investigate the significance of the 
hypothesized moderator variable. If this technique does not reveal a statistically 
significant relationship, subgroup analysis is prescribed. 
 Sharma et al. (1981) recommends the utilization of both procedures because each 
tests different properties of the hypothesized moderation. More specifically, if the 
interaction term in the moderated regression is significant, the hypothesized moderator 
impacts the form of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. Conversely, if subgroup analysis reveals a significant relationship, the 
hypothesized moderator impacts the strength of the relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. Based on Sharma’s prescriptions, both techniques 
were used to investigate the properties of the hypothesized moderator variables.   
 Table 15 presents the subgroup analysis of this moderating relationship by 
separating the firm years in which governance issues did occur (n=52) and firm years in 
which governance issues did not occur (n=1418). The results suggest that board of 
director breadth of knowledge is positively and significantly (.001 level) related to 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention when no governance issues are present. 
Table 15 also suggests that board of director breadth of knowledge is positively and 
significantly related to board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention when governance 
issues are present. However, this relationship is significant at the .1 level.   
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Intercept             -1.9580*** (.1343) -1.8790*** (.1486) -1.8620*** (.2581) -1.2770*** (.2006)
Firm Size .2569*** (.0265) .2584*** (.0265) .2420*** (.0304) .0678** (.0245)
Firm Outstanding Stock .1304 (.0878)] .1179 (.0882) .1400 (.0884) .0055 (.0700)
Firm R&D Expense .6812*** (.1107) .6845*** (.1105) .6108*** (.1124) .2600** (.0914)
Firm Age  -.0023 (.0018) -.0018 (.0018) -.0016 (.0014)
Relative Board Tenure .0427* (.0203) -.0043 (.0140)
Outside Director Ownership -.0060** (.0021) -.0070*** (.0016)
Board size .0835 (.2581) .0871 (.0983)
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attetnion 13.2658*** (.5119)
Alpha 1.5240 (.1124) 1.5128 (.1124) 1.4729 (.1106) .3563 (.0442)
LR chi2 392.54*** 394.03*** 407.25*** 1058.45***
Log likelihood -2111.0422 -2110.2979 -2103.6879 -1778.0907
Pseudo R-square .0851 .0854 .0883 .2294
Change in Pseudo R-Square  .0003 .0029 .1411
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Board-level Entrepreneurial Attention and Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions
Results of Negative Binomial Regression Models
TABLE 14
Model 3 Model 4
Firm-Level Entrepreneurial Actions
(Testing Hypothesis 6)
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Hypotheses 8a, 8b and 8c 
 Table 16 on page 137 presents the findings of an OLS regression equation. It 
considers the impact of board meeting context on board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention. This equation corresponds to Hypotheses 8a, 8b and 8c. Models 1, 2 and 3 
present the control variables for the equation, with highly correlated control variables 
entered separately to avoid multicollinearity problems. Model 4 adds the board context 
variables hypothesized to affect the amount of time that boards allocate to strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. The results suggest that hypothesis 8a, which posits a positive 
relationship with off-site percentage of board meetings with strategic entrepreneurial 
attention, is positive but not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 8a is not supported. 
Additionally, Table 16 reveals mixed support for hypothesis 8b. Two variables were 
used for measurement of board meeting frequency (number of meetings per year) and 
duration (number of meeting minutes per year). Results for both meeting frequency and 
duration were positive, but only the meeting frequency variable was found to have a 
significant relationship with board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. 
Consequently, hypothesis 8b is not supported. Further, the results suggest that the less an 
agenda’s detail the more time board’s allocate to strategic entrepreneurial attention. This 
relationship is found to be significant (.001 level). Therefore, Hypothesis 8c is strongly 
supported. 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept             
-.0302*** 
(.0044)
-.0278*** 
(.0048)
-.0438*** 
(.0093)
-.0701*** 
(.0091) Intercept             
.0068 
(.0189)
-.0038 
(.0190)
-.0352 
(.0343)
-.0479 
(.0341)
Firm Size
.0080*** 
(.0010)
.0080*** 
(.0009)
.0070*** 
(.0010)
.0051*** 
(.0010) Firm Size
.0009 
(.0033)
.0013 
(.0032)
.0030 
(.0034)
.0021 
(.0033)
Firm Outstanding 
Stock
.0107*** 
(.0030)
.0107*** 
(.0030)
.0105*** 
(.0030)
.0093*** 
(.0029) Firm Outstanding Stock
-.0051 
(.0097)
-.0051 
(.0094)
-.0151 
(.0116)
-.0232+ 
(.0121)
Firm R&D Expense
.0222*** 
(.0041)
.0224*** 
(.0041)
.0199*** 
(.0042)
.0114 
(.0040) Firm R&D Expense
.0343* 
(.0151)
.0257+ 
(.0151)
.0151 
(.0167)
.0107 
(.0164)
Firm Age
-.0001 
(.0001)
-.0001 
(.0001)
-.0001 
(.0001) Firm Age
.0004* 
(.0002)
.0005* 
(.0002)
.0004+ 
(.0002)
Relative Board Tenure
.0022** 
(.0008)
.0026*** 
(.0008) Relative Board Tenure
.0011 
(.0022)
.0021 
(.0022)
Outside Director 
Ownership
-.0001 
(.0001)
-.00004 
(.00007)
Outside Director 
Ownership
.0003 
(.0002)
.0002 
(.0002)
Board size
.0088+ 
(.0046)
.0050 
(.0044) Board size
.0124 
(.0152)
.0146 
(.0148)
Board of Director 
Breadth of Knowledge
.0239*** 
(.0021)
Board of Director 
Breadth of Knowledge
.0158+ 
(.0085)
  
F-Value 135.89*** 102.46*** 60.59*** 74.63*** F-Value 3.69* 4.07** 2.76* 2.98**
Model R-square .2238 .2248 .2312 .2976 Model R-square .1872 .2573 .3055 .3567
Adjusted R-square .2221 .2226 .2274 .2936 Adjusted R-square .1364 .1941 .1950 .2370
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Results of OLS Regression Models
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Table 15
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Moderating Impact of Governance Issues between Board of Breadth of Knowledge and Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
(Testing Hypothesis 7)
Firm-Years Without an Apparent Governance Issue (n=1418) Firm-Years With a Governance Issue (n=52)
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Intercept             -.02997*** (.0044) -.0281*** (.0047) -.0422*** (.0090) -.1230*** (.0114)
Firm Size .0079***   (.0008) .0079*** (.0008) .0071*** (.0010) .0027*** (.0008)
Firm Outstanding Stock .0103*** (.0029) .0103*** (.0029) .0100*** (.0030) .0030 (.2170)
Firm R&D Expense .0022*** (.0040) .0224*** (.0040) .0202*** (.0041) .0033 (.0250)
Firm Age -.0007 (.0001) -.0005 (.0001) -.0001+ (.0001)
Relative Board Tenure .0020** (.0008) .0022*** (.0036)
Outside Director Ownership -.00002 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
Board size .0076+ (.0044) .0019 (.0036)
Number of Board Meetings .0190*** (.0034)
% of Meetings Off-Site -.0275 (.0198)
Annual Meeting Time .0002 (.0006)
Agenda Detail .0244*** (.0014)
 
F-Value 139.51*** 105.00*** 61.79*** 128.55***
Model R-square .2221 .2228 .2283 .4924
Adjusted R-square .2205 .2207 .2246 .4885
+    p<.10 *    p<.05 **   p<.01 ***  p<.001
Results of OLS Regression Models
TABLE 16
Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Model 4
(Testing Hypothesis 8)
Board Meeting Context and Board-Level Entrepreneurial Attention
Note:  Hypothesis betas listed are unstadardized. Standard errors are in  parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The prior chapters introduced the research questions, developed the hypotheses, 
described the methodology, and reported the results of this study. This chapter provides a 
discussion of this dissertation’s findings, theoretical and practical implications, and its 
limitations. First, the dissertation’s findings are interpreted. Second, theoretical and 
practical implications derived form the results are discussed. Third, the dissertation’s 
limitations are stated. Finally, I conclude by offering future directions for research 
regarding both boards of directors and strategic entrepreneurial attention and actions in 
established organizations. 
Interpretation of Results 
 Control Variables.  As noted previously, the analyses used to test this study’s 
hypotheses included seven control variables: firm size, firm outstanding stock, firm 
research and development expense, firm age, board relative power (measured as relative 
board tenure and total board stock ownership in firm), and board size. The models 
incorporated these variables because they have proven to be significant in prior empirical 
studies related to boards of directors or corporate entrepreneurship. Of these seven 
control variables, only firm age was sufficiently correlated with the other firm variables 
to be entered in a separate model (to account for multicollinearity). Otherwise, the two 
sets of control variables, firm and board, were entered in accordance with Chapter IV’s 
theoretical arguments. 
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 The main findings of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Of the 
twenty-one sub hypotheses, categorized theoretically under eight overarching hypotheses, 
thirteen were found to be significant and were, therefore, supported (12 fully supported, 1 
partially supported).  The remaining eight hypotheses were not significant or were 
significant but not in the hypothesized direction. Therefore, these eight hypotheses were 
not supported. Below, the findings are presented via the theoretical categorization of 
Figure 1: Environmental Context, Attention Structures (Mediators), Attention to Action, 
Issues and Answers (Moderator), and Procedural and Communication Channels.  
 Environmental Context.  Prior studies, such as Burt (1983) and Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978), have found that boards help firms negotiate through the general (indirect) (i.e. 
Boyd, 1990) and industrial (direct) environments. This stream of research has explored 
the effects of environment factors on board composition and structural attributes. Prior 
studies have not examined how these same environmental factors affect a board’s focus 
of attention or a firm’s strategic entrepreneurial actions.  Through the theoretical lens of 
the Attention-Based View, it is hypothesized in this dissertation that a firm’s direct 
environmental context -- measured as a firm’s environmental dynamism, munificence 
and complexity -- will be positively related to board-level time spent on strategic 
entrepreneurial attention and the number of firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions. 
The results of this dissertation suggest that the greater the environmental dynamism or 
munificence, the more attention firm’s boards within that industry will spend on strategic 
entrepreneurship. Also, the greater the environmental dynamism or munificence, the 
more frequent the firm will engage in strategic entrepreneurship actions. In sum, 
environmental dynamism and munificence were found to have the posited positive 
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relationship with strategic entrepreneurial attention and actions (each at the .001 
significance level). 
In contrast, the relationships between environmental complexity and board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention and firm-level strategic entrepreneurial actions were 
not found to be significant. As noted in Chapter III, in comparison to both environmental 
dynamism and environmental munificence, the empirical evidence investigating 
environmental complexity is much less substantial. Numerous studies on the same or 
similar topic have produced conflicting results related to environmental complexity. For 
example, Dollinger and Golden (1992) found a positive relationship between complexity 
and performance. In contrast, Wiersema and Bantel (1993) found a negative relationship 
between complexity and firm performance.  Perhaps the construct of environmental 
complexity is too vague or, ironically, too ‘complex’ to have a merely linear relationship 
with most variables. 
     Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c posited that the environmental context may indirectly 
affect board-level entrepreneurial attention through certain mediating attention structures, 
specifically aggregate board breadth of knowledge. Similar to the results for Hypotheses 
1a-1f, environmental dynamism and environmental munificence were found have a 
significant positive relationship with board breadth of knowledge. In brief, as a firm’s 
environment becomes more dynamic or more munificent, its board’s breadth of 
knowledge appears to increase (or get broader). This means that more directors are 
outsiders (intra-industry, inter-industry or general science directors) of the firm. 
Presumably, the diversity of experience increases so that the board is better able to make 
sense of and react or anticipate the firm’s external environment. 
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 Similar to Hypothesis 1, complexity was not found to be significantly related to a 
firm’s board breadth of knowledge. Alternative explanations for this finding are the same 
as those for hypotheses 1c and 1f. 
 Attention Structures (Mediators).  In this dissertation’s adapted model of Ocasio’s 
(1997) Attention-Based View, attention structures represent mediators that operate to 
further refine the contextual intersection between the board meeting environment and the 
firm’s environment. For this study, attention structures of interest are:  
(1) intra-industry firm size (Hypotheses 3a & 3b),  
(2) aggregate board breadth of knowledge (Hypothesis 5a),  
(3) insider corporate venturing board percentage (Hypothesis 4),  
(4) intra-industry board percentage (Hypothesis 5b),  
(5) inter-industry board percentage (Hypothesis 5c) and  
(6) general science board percentage (Hypothesis 5d).  
Each of these attention structures was hypothesized to have an effect on board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attentions. Each of these relationships and their results are 
addressed below. 
 Intra-industry firm size was hypothesized to negatively affect board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention. However, and in contrast to the results of prior studies 
(e.g. Mosakowski, 2002), this study’s findings suggest a significant (.001 level) 
relationship between these two variables, but a positive one rather than the posited 
negative relationship. Similar findings occur between firm size and firm-level 
entrepreneurial actions. Ireland et al (2003) may help explain these findings. These 
authors suggest that, although small firms are typically more effective at identifying 
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entrepreneurial opportunities, they are less effective at developing and sustaining 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Consequently, maybe it is in the larger firm contexts where 
strategically entrepreneurial opportunities make it to the point of being discussed at the 
board-level. So, even though the coefficients of Hypothesis 3a and 3b are of an opposite 
sign than that hypothesized, the relationship carries some consistency with both strategic 
entrepreneurial attention and strategic entrepreneurial action sharing similar results. 
  A board’s breadth of knowledge was posited to have a positive relationship with 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. The findings suggest that as a board of 
directors becomes more diverse in experience/knowledge (different kinds of outsiders) -- 
while also coming from more entrepreneurial contexts (outsiders are from more 
entrepreneurial firms within the industry, more entrepreneurial industries, or from a 
general science environment) – the time spent on board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention will increase. 
 In an attempt to parse out the posited relationship, this dissertation tests the 
percentage directors of a board that come from:  
(1) an insider corporate venturing context, 
(2)  an intra-industry (more entrepreneurial – measured by relative r&d 
spending and entrepreneurial actions) context,  
(3) an inter-industry (more entrepreneurial industry – measured as relative 
industrial dynamism and munificence) context, or  
(4) a general science (academia or innovation house, research and 
development lab, etc…) context.  
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Results showed no significant relationship between boards that have a relatively higher 
percentage of inside corporate venturing directors on the board and board-level strategic 
entrepreneurial attention. However, these results must be considered with caution, as the 
number of firm-years with a corporate venturing insider on the board was only 31 of 
1470 observations. Therefore, approximately two percent of the observations had the 
presence of a corporate venturing insider. Despite the non significance of the hypothesis, 
this low occurrence of an entrepreneurial insider being placed on the board is somewhat 
of a finding in itself. 
 The relationship between intra-industry director percentage of the board and 
board-level entrepreneurial attention was posited to be positive, as only directors from 
firms with more entrepreneurial tendencies were considered in this percentage.  However, 
the results suggested a significant, but negative relationship. Perhaps the presence of a 
higher percentage of intra-industry directors, regardless of the entrepreneurial nature of 
the firm they come to the board from, focuses attention on more intra-industry 
competitive tactics rather than broadening the firm’s scope of opportunity.  
 The relationship between inter-industry director percentage of the board and 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention was posited to be positive, as only directors 
from industries with more entrepreneurial tendencies than those of the focus firm’s 
industry were included in this percentage. The results supported this hypothesis (.001 
level). In brief, as the percentage of inter-industry directors from more entrepreneurial 
industries increases, so too will the percentage of time the board spends on strategic 
entrepreneurial issues. 
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 The relationship between the general science director percentage of the board and 
board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention was also posited to be positive. The results 
suggested that this relationship is both significant (.001 level) and positive. In brief, as 
the proportion of directors who come from the general science community increases, so 
too will board-level time spent on strategic entrepreneurial issues. 
 Attention to Action. Board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention is the central 
variable in this dissertation’s adaptation of Ocasio’s (1997) Attention-Based View. 
Without the board’s attention affecting the firm’s actions, the model would present no 
insightful value. The relationship between these two variables was posited to be positive. 
They were both positive and significant (.001 level). Therefore, as the board spends a 
larger percentage of their meeting time on strategic entrepreneurship issues, the more 
likely the firm will engage in strategic entrepreneurial actions. 
  Issues and Answers (Moderator). Many of the posited relationships between the 
attention structure variables and board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention have been 
supported. However, certain issues may arise that take precedence over strategic 
entrepreneurship issues in competing for the board’s attention. For example, the 
hierarchy of board roles, discussed in Chapters II and IV, suggests that governance issues 
would constitute such attentional diversion. The analysis for this relationship was 
conducted on a split-sample. The split was based on the occurrence or non occurrence of 
a governance issue. Results of this moderating hypothesis suggest that the relationship 
between a board’s aggregate breadth of knowledge and its attentional allocation toward 
strategic entrepreneurial issues (found to be significantly positive in Hypothesis 5a) was 
weakened in the occurrence of governance issues. However, as in the insider corporate 
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venturing director findings, this finding must also be cautiously considered as only 51 of 
1470 observations had an occurrence of a governance issue. The data for this study 
included the fiscal year ends 1994 through 2000, prior to the many regulatory and other 
pressures for governance reform. 
 Procedural and Communication Channels.   Figure 1 also depicts three 
dimensions (first posed by Stinchcombe, 1968) -- spatial, temporal and procedural -- that 
are posited to have an affect on board-level strategic entrepreneurial attention. This 
dissertation considered these dimensions in an attempt to better understand the board 
meeting context and how each dimension may affect board-level strategic entrepreneurial 
attention. It was hypothesized that the greater the percentage of board meetings held 
away from the normal/typical meeting place (spatial dimension), the greater the board-
level strategic entrepreneurial attention. However, this relationship was not found to be 
significant or positively related. The temporal dimension posited that the greater the 
amount of meeting time a board had annually and the greater the number of meetings 
they had, the more time they would allocate toward strategic entrepreneurial attention. 
The results for this two pronged hypothesis were mixed. The positive relationship 
between the increased frequency of board meetings and increased board time allocated to 
strategic entrepreneurial attention was significant (.001 level). However, the relationship 
between the duration of the board meetings and strategic entrepreneurial attention was 
not significant. The procedural dimension suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between decreasing detail of the board meeting agenda and the board’s attentional 
allocation toward strategic entrepreneurial issues. The results significantly (.001 level) 
supported this hypothesis. Therefore, as fewer constraints are imposed on the board by 
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the person who sets the agenda, the more time that the board will spend on strategic 
entrepreneurship issues. 
Theoretical, Methodological and Practical Implications 
 The empirical findings in this dissertation suggest interesting implications for 
theoretical, methodological and practical purposes. I will first present the theoretical 
implications, followed by the methodological implications, and conclude with the 
practical implications. 
 Within the set of results examining board meeting context, strong patterns 
emerge. The primary set of patterns concerns the individual and collective experience 
breadth of the directors and how this breadth aids in shaping the attention of the meeting. 
Consistent with prior literature (Johnson, et al, 1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Dalton, et al, 1998), the classification of directors emerges as a key factor related to board 
impact. Specific to this study, the impact of interest was board meeting time allocated 
toward strategic entrepreneurship. The collective measure of board breadth of knowledge 
and the individual experience measures -- the percentage of inter-industry directors from 
more entrepreneurial industries and the percentage of general science directors -- were 
found to be significantly (.001 level) and positively related to increases in the board’s 
allocation of time (and thus attention) to strategic entrepreneurship. 
 Utilizing the Attention-Based View, this dissertation considers the multiple 
contexts that boards of directors must operate within and attempt to affect in the favor of 
the company for which they serve. This more accurate depiction of the contexts that the 
board encounters and makes its decision within allows researchers to apply a more fully 
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specified model of boards than those applied in the past, which typically examined each 
relationship separately.  
  Methodologically, this study makes a contribution through its unique 
classification of outsiders’ recent experience relative to the firm’s industry (used as a 
proxy of a director’s entrepreneurial disposition). Board researchers have argued that 
boards need to have a high degree of specialized knowledge and skills to perform 
effectively (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). However, the relevance of director specialization 
surely depends on the issues on which expertise or perspective is of most importance to 
the firm’s success. Therefore, in an effort to explore strategic entrepreneurship and board 
relationships, this study utilized a categorization system that attempted to classify 
directors based on their varying entrepreneurial experience contexts.   This classification, 
as noted above, resulted in many significant relationships. These findings offer the first 
empirical support for a more detailed parsing of the more common dichotomous 
classification of directors as merely insider or outsider. The importance of outsiders who 
approach the director’s table from a more strategically entrepreneurial context appears to 
affect the attentional allocation within the meeting. Of course, there is an implicit 
assumption, and potential limitation, that a director’s expertise will be used. 
 Another methodological contribution is the use of content analysis to code 
company board minutes. Based upon the directors’ discussions recorded in the minutes, 
this dissertation assumed that attentional allocation (via discussion) was based on 
perceived importance of issues to the firm. The access to and analysis of this quantity of 
board minutes is unique to prior literature.  
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 From a practical perspective, the results of this dissertation suggest that 
shareholders need to consider both the environmental context that their firm competes in 
and the competitive context from which directors are nominated and selected. There are 
direct relationships between environmental dynamism and environmental munificence. 
Also, there are significant indirect relationships through board mediators to board-level 
strategic entrepreneurial attention and through board-level attention to firm-level strategic 
entrepreneurial actions. To best increase the probabilities that a firm will act in a 
strategically entrepreneurial manner, a shareholder should attempt to elect directors from 
outside its own industry and perhaps outside of business (general science). Ghoshal and 
Nohria (1989) notes that from a practical standpoint, board structure is one of the few 
factors in today’s complex, uncertain business environment that boards and top 
management teams (TMT) can directly control. Therefore, the questions examined in this 
dissertation directly inform key strategic decisions made by firms.     
Limitations   
 A possible limitation of this study is a mis-specified model. Other mechanisms 
employed by firms to reduce environmental uncertainty were not considered. For 
example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that firms may use control (e.g., mergers 
and acquisition), coordination (e.g., trade associations, cartels), cooperative (e.g., joint 
ventures, strategic alliances), and cooptation activities to reduce environmental 
uncertainty. This study, however, only examined the association of boards of directors as 
sense makers of the uncertain environment related to opportunities for the firm. 
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Consequently, the presence of other mechanisms used to reduce environmental 
uncertainty, which were not measured in this study, may have affected the results. 
 The omission of top management team (TMT) characteristics may have 
influenced the results of this study. Perhaps these characteristics, which were not 
included in the models, also help firms to negotiate uncertainty (e.g., D’Aveni & 
Macmillan, 1990). This study did not include several variables that could help in 
explaining variations in strategic entrepreneurial attention and actions. However, it is 
important to note the focus of this study is on boards of directors’ posited relationship 
with strategic entrepreneurship. 
 The use of demographic factors to serve as proxies for latent constructs may 
represent a potential limitation of this study. When interpreting the results of this study, it 
is important to recognize the literature admonishing the dangers of this type of “black 
box” research (e.g. Lawrence, 1997; Priem, Lyon, & Dess, 1999). This stream of research 
suggests that demographic variables are not necessarily congruent with the subjective 
concepts (e.g., communication frequency, cognitive diversity) that they purportedly 
represent (Lawrence, 1997). As a result of these weaknesses, critics warn that the 
interpretation of the results of such studies is precarious and potentially misleading. In 
essence, this study employs demographic variables to represent latent constructs such as 
aggregate board level breadth of knowledge. However, the variables used in this study 
may not be congruent with these subjective concepts, and consequently, this study maybe 
subject to the dangers of misapplication.  
 An additional potential limitation of this study is its assumption of a two year lag 
between board-level attention and firm-level actions related to strategic entrepreneurship. 
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Given that the board of director’s impact on firm actions is highly complex, this time lag 
may be less in some instance and more in others, depending on the scope and size of the 
action.  
 The three diverse industries allow these finding to be conveyed over a large 
population of firms. But, the generalizability of its findings to firms of certain sizes may 
be suspect. The sample of firms began with a diverse set of companies of different sizes. 
Unfortunately, a disproportionate number of small companies had to be dropped due to 
poor minute detail. Therefore, larger firms are more heavily represented in the current 
sample. Therefore, the generalizability of findings is more applicable to them. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Several areas in the board of directors and strategic entrepreneurship literatures 
provide promise for future investigation. Future topics include the association between 
top management team (TMT) characteristics and strategic entrepreneurship attention and 
actions, firm founder’s role, and CEO characteristics.         
 Additionally, broadening the sample of contexts beyond the three industries 
selected for this study would be wise. While these three industries were intentionally 
selected due to their variance in direct environmental contexts, there are many contexts in 
between and at each extreme that may produce varying results.  
The manner in which this study collected data from board minutes opens the 
“black box” of board activity and how this activity related to actions. The answer to “how 
do boards matter?” appears much more attainable.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF KEY WORDS/PHRASES FOR SEARCHING STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIONS 
 
Key Words/Phrases 
 
Acquire (acquisition) Acquire (acquisition)  Risk 
Action       Spin-off 
Alertness      Strategy 
Change      Take a chance 
Differentiate      Take advantage of  
Discovery      Uncertainty 
Competitive advantage    Venture 
Create (creation, form, produce, make, originate) 
Develop 
Discover 
Diversify 
Enterprising 
Entrepreneurial 
Exploit 
Firm capabilities 
Future 
Growth (grow) 
Improve   
Innovate 
Intrepreneuring 
Invent 
Invest 
Joint venture 
Market 
Merger 
Networks 
New strategy 
New market 
New product 
New process  
Novelty 
Patent 
Opportunity 
Proactive 
Research and Development 
Renewal 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF KEY WORDS/PHRASES FOR SEARCHING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PROBLEMS 
 
Key Words/Phrases 
 
Accountability 
Accusation 
Agency problem 
Charges 
Cheat 
Complaint 
Conflicting interests 
Corporate governance 
Corruption 
Criminal 
Crisis 
Deceive 
Deceit 
Deceptive 
Dishonest 
Ethics 
Falsify 
Fraud 
Governance 
Grievance 
Illegal (wrong, unlawful) 
Improper 
Inflating 
Legal 
Lie 
Malfeasance (wrongdoing) 
Mismanagement  
Proxy proposal 
Overstated 
Restate  
Scandal 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Understated 
Unethical
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